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Before describing each of the articles in this issue, let me take a momentto comment on the sorts of problems that arise in editing a journalintended for both a United States and Canadian audience.  The
American Judges Association was formed in the United States and has most of
its members there.  It also has a substantial—and growing—membership in
Canada.  As our Canadian readers are well aware, there are some differences in
the way the English language is used in Canada and in the United States.  (For
an entertaining and enlightening discussion of some of the differences, pre-
pared by the Cornerstone Word Company of Ottawa, take a look at
http://www.cornerstoneword.com/misc/cdneng/cdneng.htm.)
I raise this topic because the lead essay in this issue is by a Canadian judge,
Ian B. Cowan, who wrote about Canadian
events with appropriately Canadian spellings.
Our journal, like most others, has made certain
style choices, and we use U.S. English spellings.
Thus, labour became labor and offences became
offenses, all without either the labor or the
intent of Judge Cowan.  Meanwhile, on the
Resource Page at the end of this issue, the word
license is spelled in the Canadian way—
licence—because it is part of the actual title of
a Canadian publication.   
I hope that our Canadian readers will not
mind our choices.  All publications try to
achieve a single, consistent editing style.  We spend a great deal of effort in the
editing of each issue.  Substantively, though, we also spend time trying to get
articles and materials that will be of interest to all of our readers, both in
Canada and in the United States.
Judge Cowan’s essay should be of interest to many.  He happened to be in
the crosshairs of the SARS epidemic in Toronto, which forced careful consider-
ation of both legal and practical concerns in handling quarantine orders against
potentially infected citizens.  
Our lead article, by Paula Hannaford-Agor, places efforts to help pro se liti-
gants into their broader context.  She describes the changes under way in some
places to allow “unbundled” legal services, in which an attorney helps with
some, but not all, aspects of a client’s legal problem.  She also discusses how
these sorts of changes may impact the role of courts in helping self-represented
litigants gain appropriate access to their judicial system.
Two other articles round out the issue.  Andrew Fulkerson, a former judge,
reviews the usefulness of ignition interlock devices as a way of preventing
repeat impaired-driving offenses.  We also include last year’s winning entry
from our law student essay competition.  In it, Rosalind Alexis Sargent presents
her views on racial inequities in the federal sentencing guidelines. —SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
38 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
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LegalTrac.
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Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
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Upon assuming the presidency of the American Judges
Association at the 2002 Annual Conference in Maui, I indicated
that it was one of my goals for the AJA to have a greater partic-
ipation in the activities of the United Nations.  We have an
association with the U.N. as a Non-Governmental Organization
(NGO) affiliate. 
As you know, the U.N. headquarters is located at 47th Street
and 1st Avenue in Manhattan, now know as United Nations
Plaza. There are six main, interconnected structures compris-
ing the New York headquarters, which is bordered by the East
River. There are also other buildings adjacent to the headquar-
ters that house other U.N. offices, including the Pass
Office, the UNICEF House, the FF Building, and the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
During my tenure as AJA president, I have
attended meetings at the United Nations on several
occasions. Prior to entering the U.N., you must
obtain a pass to enable you to enter the grounds and
buildings.  Before my trips, I contacted the NGO
Resource Center, requesting that they make arrange-
ments through the Pass Office for the issuance of a pass.
Security at the site has been increased as a result of recent
world events. Those wishing to enter the facilities must fill out
a detailed questionnaire, present several forms of identification,
and be photographed. Once a pass is issued, which bears your
photograph, it must be worn at all times while on the premises. 
On one of my first trips to the headquarters, I met with
Louis Delgadillo, who works within the United Nations at the
NGO Resource Center in the Department of Public Information
(DPI).  When I first met with him, he informed me of the plan-
ning that was in progress for the 56th Annual DPI/NGO
Conference, which was to be held September 8-10, 2003 at the
United Nations.  The theme of the conference was Human
Security and Dignity: Fulfilling the Promise of the United
Nations. After reviewing the materials for the conference, I
thought it would provide an excellent opportunity both to
interact and meet with other NGO members. I was not disap-
pointed.
Since its founding, the United Nations has always played an
important role in the affairs of nations, but perhaps never more
so than now. The U.N. has traditionally served as a meeting
place for the countries of the world to both confer and mediate
disputes that occasionally arise between member states.  As this
column was being written, the General Assembly of the United
Nations is in session. The leaders of the world have been
addressing the General Assembly, including President George
Bush of the United States. Many of the speeches have addressed
the issue of armed conflicts around the globe. The longstanding
alliances between the United States and some of its oldest allies,
such as France, are now being tested as a result of the United
States involvement in Iraq. The interest of the world community
in the proceedings of the U.N. has never been greater.
The annual conference began with an opening
plenary session that was conducted in the General
Assembly Hall on September 8. The session was
called to order and welcoming speeches were then
provided by various officials of the United Nations,
including Kofi A. Annan, the U.N. Secretary
General, and by the NGO officials. In addition to
the plenary sessions, numerous workshops were
conducted, enabling those in attendance to partici-
pate in programs that were of special interest to them. The
afternoon session that was conducted on the first day was enti-
tled, “Psychological Aspects of Human Security and Dignity.”
The second day sessions were entitled, “Educating for a Secure
Future,” and, “From Oppression to Empowerment.” Actor
Danny Glover, who has been involved with the U.N. for many
years, moderated the second session. On September 10, the last
day of the conference, the sessions were entitled, “Sustainable
Development in the Context of Globalization,” and “A
Conversation with Eminent Persons on Global Trends and
Strategies.” 
On Monday, September 8, I attended the conference recep-
tion, as did many of the individuals who had registered for the
conference.  At this reception, I was fortunate enough to both
meet and briefly speak with the Secretary General, Kofi A.
Annan.  It was both an honor and a pleasure to meet this man.
He surely has one of the most difficult jobs in the world today. 
My participation in the conference was both educational and
rewarding. It is my sincere hope that our association continues
to participate in the United Nations through our affiliation as
an NGO. 
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President’s Column
Francis X. Halligan, Jr.
Footnotes
1. See Rev. Stat. Ontario 1990, ch. H.7., §§ 22, 36, 39.  The proce-
dures described in this article were designed to comply with the
requirements of these statutory provisions.
The phone message was as subtle andunexpected as the disease. It wasfrom the lawyer for the medical offi-
cer of health for the region, who enquired
if the court could deal with applications
forcing people into quarantine, after nor-
mal court hours. It was to prompt a reac-
tion and the introduction of procedures
in the Ontario Court of Justice in
Brampton, Ontario, to deal with a possi-
ble epidemic, which we never anticipated
we would ever have to use.
Brampton, Ontario, used to be a sleepy
county town outside of Toronto. Its
motto is “Flowertown,” and the center of
town features a band shell in a shaded
park setting. But with the rapid growth of
Toronto in the latter part of the last cen-
tury and the expansion of Toronto’s air-
port, it had become part of the larger
region of Peel, population of over one
million people and location of the busiest
court in the province of Ontario.
The newspapers in the last week of
March and first week of April had
reported a number of people falling ill
from a mysterious illness called SARS (an
acronym for Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome). They had been part of a small
group that had been at the Metropole
Hotel in Hong Kong, who had come into
contact with a doctor who was ill with
the same disease. The reports were that
one person had died in hospital and at
least two others were very ill. It sounded
as though it was a contained illness. 
The information I received in my
phone call back to the lawyer for the
medical officer of health changed all that.
He told me that the medical officer of
health (medical officer) was preparing for
a larger number of people who may have
been in contact with the infected persons
and he wanted to be prepared in the
event that he made a quarantine order
and they refused to comply. The medical
officer wanted to invoke the special pow-
ers under the Health Protection and
Promotion Act (“HPPA”),1 a provincial
statute, to obtain a court order forcing
quarantine or treatment.  
I had heard of this statute only once
before, at a meeting with my regional
senior judge in connection with its use
for dealing with tuberculosis cases, which
seemed then to be on the rise. The senior
judge had conducted a hearing when a
patient with tuberculosis was refusing
treatment and the medical officer brought
an application to force treatment. We had
thought that “special arrangements,”
such as masks, should be put in place to
deal with this sort of application. But
apart from that, the existence of this
statute was tucked away for future refer-
ence. We had no idea what “special
arrangements” such proceedings might
require in a disease outbreak.
The statute allows the medical officer
to bring an application before a judge by
way of a motion, supported by affidavit
evidence that he has ordered a person
into treatment or quarantine for medical
reasons and that the subject of the order
is refusing to do this. There is provision
for the judge to order the person into
quarantine or treatment as well as puni-
tive provisions in the event they do not
comply. The police can be ordered to
assist in apprehending a person who does
not comply. The time periods for motions
and appearances were all to be done in
accordance with the rules of practice for
provincial offenses.
Two days after the initial phone call,
on the Friday of the week, a colleague in
the suburban Newmarket court north of
the city e-mailed me and told me he had
an emergency SARS application and was
going into court to deal with it. It turned
out to be an application by his region’s
medical officer, without notice to the
subject of the application, to have him
quarantined, as he was a suspected car-
rier. Because of the urgency of the appli-
cation and seriousness of the problem,
the judge granted an order to have the
subject detained by the police and taken
to a quarantine facility at an area hospital,
where on Monday there would be a hear-
ing conducted by telephone with the sub-
ject calling the court. 
On Monday, my colleague had
arranged for the telephone hook-up to
the hospital where the subject was now
detained.  A legal aid lawyer was online
to advise the subject on legal issues and
the hearing commenced early in the
morning. The hearing gave little guid-
ance to us in how to handle future hear-
ings, however, because the lawyer for the
medical officer began by announcing that
he was now satisfied that the subject had
not been exposed to SARS and he was
withdrawing his application. My col-
league asked the subject, “Do you under-
stand?” His reply demonstrated his
understanding.  “Yes,” he said, “but I will
be speaking to my lawyer about this.” He
had been in the hospital since Friday. 
Based on that slim experience our
court began to gear up. An ad hoc group
composed of the regional senior judge of
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The Court’s Role in Preventing Epidemics
Ian B. Cowan
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1. The contact persons in the courthouse for Health Protection and Promotion Act (HPPA) applications are the judicial secre-
tary [telephone no.], the Local Administrative Justice [business, home, and cell phones], or the Trial Coordinator [telephone
no.].
2. The normal hours of court operation are Monday to Friday from 8.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. Applications outside of normal hours
may be done on an emergency basis and with prior permission of the Local Administrative Justice.
3. The Medical Officer of Health (MEDICAL OFFICER) or his counsel may bring an application before the court on short
notice. The application will set out that, by direction of the Local Administrative Justice, the respondent shall not appear in
person but only by telephone from his residence by calling (telephone of the trial coordinator) by 9.00 a.m. on the return
date, at which time a court hearing will be conducted. In addition to appearing by telephone, the respondent may appear by
counsel or agent. 
4. At this initial hearing the respondent will be asked by telephone, if he/she wishes to dispute the making of the Order sought
by the MEDICAL OFFICER. In the event he/she does not consent, the respondent will be asked if he/she is prepared to con-
duct a hearing by telephone. If this is not agreeable, then the hearing Judge, on the advice of the MEDICAL OFFICER and
upon hearing from the respondent, will consider the manner and place of conducting a full hearing and any interim orders
to be made pending the hearing.
5. The MEDICAL OFFICER will file the application with the Trial Coordinator on the second floor of the Davis Court, and
deliver a copy to the contact person on the sixth floor at least on the day before the hearing. To prevent the appearance in
person and to minimize the risks involved in the event the respondent appears in person, the hearing will be returnable in
the Special Hearing Courtroom room H-1, at 7765 Hurontario Street, Brampton, at 9:00 a.m. on a date agreed upon with the
contact person. In his application the MEDICAL OFFICER will give to the respondent the number of the contact person.  It
shall also set out that any attempt by the respondent to appear in court in person by the respondent may he treated by the
court as a serious breach of court directive. 
6. Upon notification by the MEDICAL OFFICER, the contact person will notify the following persons in the management
group: the building manager, the Local Administrative Judge, the manager of court operations, Peel Police Inspector, and the
Trial Coordinator.
7. The courtroom will be signed as “Special Hearing Room No. 1.” Signage will be prepared indicating that the court proceed-
ing is closed to the public. 
8. The MEDICAL OFFICER will provide N-95 masks, alcohol hand wipes, and any other garments that will, in the opinion of
the MEDICAL OFFICER, provide protection from SARS infection for participants in the hearing in the event the respondent
appears in contravention to the directive in the motion. It is expected that the following persons will be involved: the Judge,
a court reporter (the Judge may take a portable tape recorder to court to alleviate the need for a reporter), a police officer,
counsel for the MEDICAL OFFICER, the respondent’s agent or counsel.
9. It is desirable that the process to be followed be as close as possible to the following:
a) A police officer wearing a protective mask, and any other protective equipment deemed to be appropriate, should
be stationed outside the special hearing court entrance;
b) Someone who can identify the respondent should be stationed by the main entrance to prevent the respondent
from coming to the special hearing court; 
c) Failure of the respondent to follow these instructions should be conveyed to the Judge before entering as well as
any recommendations for the protection for all parties.
Dated this 19th day of April, 2003
Justice Ian B. Cowan
Local Administrative Judge
PROTOCOL FOR HPPA APPLICATIONS IN THE DAVIS COURT BY THE MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH
the Superior Court, the manager of court
operations, the Peel Police inspector in
charge of court operations, and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) liai-
son officer for federal operations at the
airport met within days to discuss how
we could deal with the applications we
might receive. The Superior Court had an
interest as they might have to deal with
appeals from our decisions. The Peel
Police and RCMP had an interest in the
discussions, since they might have to
detain subjects of these proceedings and
orders. 
Our first protocol to deal with applica-
tions was based on the medical advice
that SARS was not airborne and if the
subject or the court staff were masked,
there would be adequate protection for
those involved in a hearing. We talked
about having a portable trailer brought
into the parking lot, but securing and
funding it were problems.  We selected an
unused office near a side entrance of the
courthouse where the subject could be
ordered to appear for the hearing. This
would limit exposure to others coming
into the main building and would allow
the police to control the movements of a
suspected carrier in the building. 
By the time we set this procedure in
place, however, the medical information
was changing. Now more people in the
city had been exposed to other carriers
and were falling ill and dying. The latest
information was that SARS could live
outside the body for up to 24 hours and
could remain on surfaces such as coun-
ters for this time. We could not risk hav-
ing a subject come into the main court-
house and possibly contaminate others or
having the courthouse quarantined. 
Next to the main court building is an
older building housing the land registry
office upstairs and two unused court-
rooms in the basement, with a private
entrance leading to them. It would be
perfect for a hearing in the event the per-
son wanted to come to court to contest
the application as they would not come
into contact with anyone else except the
judge, the police controlling the
entrance, and the medical officer. It was
perfect—until the personnel in the reg-
istry office heard about us locating it
there. Now, threatened labor issues pre-
vented us from using the building. 
By this time, the best medical informa-
tion was that putting people who were
suspected of having SARS into quarantine
was the best way of containing its spread.
And it was equally apparent that
although we wanted to protect a person’s
right to a fair hearing, we could not risk
having them come to court, but would
have to direct them, by an ex parte order,
to a place of quarantine (either their
house or a hospital) and have a telephone
hearing from there. They, of course, could
have a lawyer or an agent attend, but they
would be prohibited from attending in
person. The courtroom in the basement
of the registry building was kept as the
hearing room because we then could
make sure that the subject never entered
the building.
By the time we had this in place, SARS
started to retreat. The quarantine proce-
dures had worked and the spread of the
disease was under control. By the end, we
did not have a single court hearing or
application and our protocols went
unused. SARS is no longer a problem and
life has returned to normal.
Why had we not had more cases? I
anticipated more cases coming from the
airport. Many passengers came in daily
from infected countries, but at the time
there was no screening in place such as
thermal scanners. These will be part of
the future airport health procedures and
are now arriving. 
People generally complied with orders
to go into quarantine. There were isolated
cases of students leaving quarantine to
write exams or workers going back to
work early and plants being closed. But
people seemed to realize the importance
of being quarantined.
As with September 11, our legal world
changed in dealing with infectious dis-
eases. This was our wake-up call. We are
now preparing with federal, provincial,
and local health officials in the event we
have to deal with another SARS-like
virus. The airport will likely be a front
line of defense with inspection, detection
and quarantine facilities. The court will
have to have facilities to quickly deal
with persons refusing to be quarantined
or treated for suspected viruses. We will
have in place videoconference hearing
facilities, together with legal counsel on
call to protect the legal rights of subjects. 
Other courts must be prepared, with
appropriate procedures in place. Any
court in a major city of the world with an
international airport has to be in a posi-
tion to deal with the legal issues arising
from the spread of an infectious virus.
Perhaps the procedures we adopted—set
out separately on the preceding page—
will help others to address these issues.
Hopefully, as in our case, the procedures
will never have to be used. But if they do,
the court will be an essential link in the
health chain that will save lives. 
Ian B. Cowan was a sole
practitioner for 26 years
in the Judicial District of
Peel outside of Toronto.
This included acting as
prosecutor for the
Department of Justice
and as an assistant
Crown Attorney for the
District. He was appointed as a judge for
the Ontario Court of Justice in 1997 and
has been the local administrative justice for
the Ontario Court in Peel since 1999.
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For several years, judges, court staff, and a growing numberof lawyers have recognized that at least one party is notrepresented by a lawyer in a sizeable portion of family law
and smaller civil cases.  Often both parties are self-represented.
Two underlying factors associated with self-represented litiga-
tion—the relative scarcity of affordable legal services and an
increased “do-it-yourself” attitude by many litigants—are fairly
self-evident.  What is less clear is how best to ensure that these
litigants have sufficient access to the justice system to be able
to resolve legal problems fairly and effectively.
Courts and legal service providers have tried a variety of
approaches to address the needs of self-represented litigants.
Some maintain that the best solution is to steer litigants back
toward competent legal counsel and so have focused their
efforts on promoting greater lawyer participation in pro bono
programs and securing adequate funding for legal services
agencies.  Some provide self-represented litigants with basic
materials and legal resources such as simplified forms and
instructions to help litigants maneuver their way through the
civil justice system.  Still others champion the use of alternative
dispute resolution programs, trying to divert self-represented
litigants away from the more adversarial and procedurally com-
plex venue of traditional court proceedings.  Although each of
these approaches can claim some measure of success, it is clear
that none has been fully effective.
This article describes how the influx of self-represented liti-
gants has forced many within the court and legal communities
to reconsider some of the fundamental premises on which the
civil justice system is based and to respond in new and creative
ways to changing litigant demands on existing court and legal
resources.  It focuses on changes to the delivery of legal services
to low- and moderate-income people, especially the emergence
of “unbundled” legal services, and addresses the practical
implications related to the distinction between legal informa-
tion and legal advice.  Finally, it describes how judges and court
staff are rethinking the conceptual design of the civil justice
system and addressing specific factors associated with legal
complexity and the inherent limitations of laypersons that cre-
ate barriers to access for self-represented litigants.
SCARCITY OF AFFORDABLE LEGAL SERVICES
The major factor contributing to the increase in self-repre-
sented litigation is fairly obvious: a sizeable number of self-rep-
resented litigants proceed without a lawyer simply because they
lack sufficient income to afford one.  This trend has been well-
documented for quite some time.  In 1994, for example, the
American Bar Association conducted an in-depth study of the
legal needs of low-income Americans and found that 47% of
low-income households experienced a new or existing legal
need each year, but only 29% were addressed through the
legal/judicial system and 38% went unaddressed altogether.1 A
second study of the legal needs of moderate-income Americans
had similar findings.  An estimated 52% of moderate-income
households experienced a new or existing legal need each year,
but only 39% of those needs were addressed through the
legal/judicial system and 26% went unaddressed altogether.2
Both studies indicated that the vast majority of legal problems
encountered were relatively uncomplicated, both factually and
legally.  The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), which was cre-
ated in 1974 to provide legal assistance to low-income
Americans, estimates that four out of every five income-eligible
people who apply for assistance are turned away because the
LSC lacks the resources to help them all.3 Despite the best
intentions of the legal community, two decades of pro bono
recruitment efforts have not yet begun to fill the gap in legal
assistance needs for these low-income Americans. Nor are they
likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
The results of these unmet needs are two-fold.  First, many
people simply do without legal solutions.  They give up on
recovering damages from minor contractual disagreements or
smaller civil claims, or fail to defend against claims asserted
against them for which they would otherwise have a legal rem-
edy or defense.  Others delay filing for divorce until some
unspecified time in the future when they or their estranged
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Helping the Pro Se Litigant:
A Changing Landscape
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor
Footnotes
The research on which this article was based was funded by grants
from the State Justice Institute (SJI-00-N-248), the Open Society
Institute (No. 20001562), the Center for Access to the Courts
Through Technology, and the Illinois Institute of Technology.  The
points of view expressed are those of the author and do not necessar-
ily represent the official positions or policies of the State Justice
Institute, the Open Society Institute, the Center for Access to the
Courts Through Technology, the Illinois Institute of Technology, or
the National Center for State Courts.  For additional information
about the project, please contact Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, National
Center for State Courts, 300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, Virginia,
23185 (telephone: [757] 259-1556, facsimile: [757] 564-2065; e-mail:
phannaford@ ncsc.dni.us).
1. American Bar Association, Report on the Legal Needs of the Low-
Income Public: Findings of the Comprehensive Legal Needs
Study (1994).
2. American Bar Association, Report on the Legal Needs of the
Moderate-Income Public: Findings of the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study (1994). 
3. Legal Services Corporation, Serving the Civil Legal Needs of Low-
Income Americans: A Special Report to Congress 14 (2000).
spouses might be able to afford a lawyer, and in the meantime
muddle through with informal (and hence unenforceable)
agreements for child support and the distribution of assets and
debts.  Most are unaware of the potential consequences of
doing without legal assistance.  Second, those who do not have
the option to forgo a legal remedy are forced to navigate the
civil justice system without a lawyer, becoming the ubiquitous
pro se litigants that cause so much consternation for judges,
court staff, and lawyers representing opposing parties or other
litigants on the docket.
Judicial and legal policy makers have gradually come to the
realization that there will never be enough affordable legal ser-
vices to meet the demand for full legal representation for all eli-
gible individuals.  Given existing budgetary constraints, a
400% increase in funding for legal services is highly unlikely.
Similarly unlikely is a dramatic increase in pro bono activity by
lawyers, a dramatic decrease in legal fees, or a return to the
barter system of an earlier era in which clients could pay for
legal assistance with their own goods or services.
This new understanding has spurred two significant shifts in
philosophy—one within the courts community about what
constitutes the principal components of access to justice and
another within the legal community about how best to deliver
legal services.  For judges and court staff, the initial concern
was how to address the ethical and practical implications of
increased numbers of self-represented litigants.  The departure
from the traditional model of litigants represented by compe-
tent attorneys posed enormous challenges for courts in terms of
both increased staff time and administrative costs as well as
perceived restrictions on the ability of judges and court staff to
offer meaningful assistance.
An early response by many courts was to vigorously main-
tain existing barriers to self-representation—for example, by
strictly enforcing “no legal advice” policies for court staff and
holding self-represented litigants to the most exacting proce-
dural standards—in hopes that these efforts would discourage
litigants from seeking legal recourse in the courts without first
obtaining competent legal representation.  Over time, however,
some courts changed their minds about the wisdom of this
approach—in part, because it was largely ineffective and ulti-
mately counter-productive.  In spite of barriers, the number of
self-represented litigants continued to rise, and the failure of
courts to offer them any assistance not only exacerbated logis-
tical problems but also undermined public trust and confidence
in the courts as effective and responsive social institutions.
An even more important consideration was the growing
realization that the majority of self-represented litigants had
legitimate legal problems that could only be resolved through
judicial intervention.  The concept of access to justice has long
been considered by the civil justice community as synony-
mous with access to a lawyer, largely out of recognition that
the American justice system is an extraordinarily complex
institution.  This framework, however, has always been
premised on the
assumption of an
adequate supply of
affordable legal ser-
vices: judicial and
legal policy makers
had not contem-
plated how low- and
m o d e r a t e - i n c o m e
people would obtain
access to justice if the
cost of legal services
increased beyond the
financial means of
most households or, for that matter, of government agencies to
provide to eligible individuals.  As the new reality took hold, a
growing number of judicial policy makers adopted the view
that a fundamental requirement of access to justice is access to
the courts and that access to lawyers, as articulated in the
Sixth Amendment, is not sufficient by itself to ensure access to
justice.4 This new outlook prompted a radical change in the
willingness of courts to respond to the needs of self-repre-
sented litigants. 
At the same time that the courts were grappling with the
implications of growing numbers of self-represented litigants,
the legal community, especially lawyers who regularly worked
with low- and moderate-income individuals, was forced to con-
front how changing economic circumstances were affecting the
delivery of legal services.  The traditional view was that any-
thing less than full-service representation was tantamount to
unequal protection, in effect creating a lower or even non-exis-
tent standard of justice for the poor and near-poor.  At first there
was great resistance to abandoning this view. But recognizing
the limitations of scarce resources, the LSC in the late 1990s
adopted a dramatically different strategy for carrying out its mis-
sion to promote equal access to the justice system.  Rather than
insisting on full-representation for all of its clients, the LSC
sought to increase the availability of legal services to eligible
persons by providing legal information and limited assistance to
those individuals with relatively uncomplicated problems.  It
could then reserve full representation for those individuals with
more complicated cases, and those who, due to cognitive or
emotional limitations, would be unable to pursue claims effec-
tively on their own.  This strategy was implemented by requir-
ing local agencies to specify how they planned to meet the needs
of self-represented litigants, and to document how effectively
they had done so, as a condition of receiving federal funding.
A similar dynamic also took place in many local pro bono
programs.  Due to increased specialization within the legal pro-
fession as well as limitations on the amount of time and
resources that individual lawyers could devote to full-represen-
tation on a pro bono basis, many local programs established
legal hotlines and clinics in which lawyers could contribute a
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couple of hours each
month for consultation
on routine legal matters
without undertaking
ongoing responsibility for
the case.  Similar efforts
include legal workshops
or clinics that educate
people about legal rights
and provide minimal
assistance in completing
court documents.
Both the LSC and the
pro bono approaches are
the no-fee corollary of
the “unbundled” model
of legal services delivery
in which lawyers undertake discrete legal tasks—consultation
and legal advice, preparation or review of legal forms, in-court
representation—for a full or only slightly reduced fee.  This
model makes it possible for individuals to obtain access to
competent legal advice and assistance on those aspects of their
cases that they most desire help, without paying full legal fees
for tasks that they feel comfortable doing themselves.  It also
accommodates the desires of many litigants to have a more
active role in how their cases are managed, including the time-
liness of a final resolution.
The unbundled services model has not been enthusiastically
embraced in all parts of the country.  Many lawyers express
concerns about the ethical obligations of discrete task repre-
sentation as well as the potential for professional malpractice
liability.  A secondary concern is whether the local judiciary
will respect limited representation agreements.  Recent changes
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly permit
these types of arrangements, provided that they are reasonable
under the circumstances and that the client gives informed
consent to the agreement.5 Even with these assurances, this
model poses challenges for lawyers.  To be a cost-effective
model for both lawyers and clients, for example, the lawyer
must have the immediate knowledge required to provide com-
petent legal advice and assistance in a timely manner: there is
no opportunity for a lawyer to spend two to ten hours research-
ing a legal question at $100 or more per hour.  Thus, lawyers
must know the law very well and be fairly proficient with diag-
nostic interviews in order to provide competent legal assistance
on an unbundled basis, skills that are generally not the
province of younger, less experienced lawyers.
The rise in consumer demand for unbundled legal services
has helped to draw a distinction between what are quintessen-
tially legal services—that is, the tasks that form the core of the
ever-ambiguous phrase “practice of law”—and those tangential
services that lawyers have traditionally performed for clients in
the course of carrying out the representation.  This then has
become the starting point for how the court and legal commu-
nities address the second set of factors that impede access to
justice for self-represented litigants: restrictions on the avail-
ability of legal information that litigants need to make informed
decisions about how to pursue a claim or defense, including
whether to retain a lawyer for some or all of the case.
LEGAL INFORMATION AND LEGAL ADVICE
Richard Zorza, lawyer, author,6 and consultant to many
courts and legal organizations on access to justice issues, has a
useful illustration to explain the distinction between legal
advice and legal information:  “If you ask a question of two
lawyers, and get two different answers, and neither lawyer is
committing malpractice, that is legal advice.  But if there is only
one right answer, that is legal information.”  Legal information
should be available to all people and from any source, including
non-lawyers and even court staff (who are uniquely knowledge-
able about legal information, especially local court procedure).7
Although obviously tongue-in-cheek, Zorza’s explanation is
a useful one for thinking about what lawyers do for clients that
clients are unable to effectively do for themselves.  It also  dis-
tinguishes those functions from those that individuals can do
for themselves if given access to accurate legal information.  A
recent project of the National Center for State Courts, con-
ducted in cooperation with the Chicago-Kent College of Law
and the Illinois Institute of Technology’s Institute of Design,8
identified five categories of legal services, defining that term as
the composite of legal advice and legal information that consti-
tutes traditional legal representation in the civil justice system.
These five categories—diagnosis, logistics, strategies, resolu-
tion, and enforcement—are the areas that self-represented liti-
gants appear to struggle with the most.  As we shall see, most
of these categories have varying mixtures of legal advice and
legal information, so identifying the aspects of each category
that consist mainly of legal advice provides a preliminary tem-
plate for the tasks that the legal community might provide
through a model of unbundled legal services.  Similarly, the
specific aspects of each category that consist mainly of legal
information can be the starting point for either the courts or
the legal community to provide information services for self-
represented litigants.
Diagnosis
The diagnosis category is premised on the assumption that
most individuals, given the tools to do so, will attempt to
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comments [6] – [8].  
6. RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM
THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS (NCSC,
2002).
7. John M. Greacen, Legal Information vs. Legal Advice: Developments
During the Last Five Years, 84 JUDICATURE 198 (2001); John M.
Greacen, No Legal Advice from Court Personnel! What Does That
Mean?,  JUDGES’ J., Winter 1995, at 10.
8. The project was funded by grants from the State Justice Institute
(SJI-00-N-248), the Open Society Institute (No. 20001562), the
Center for Access to the Courts Through Technology, and the
Illinois Institute of Technology.
resolve problems in a rational and responsible manner—legally
and effectively.  So when confronted with a legal problem, the
most important questions for which people seek answers are:
• What are my legal options?
• Are any legal, financial, moral, or other important impli-
cations related to those options?
• How are those options pursued?
• How much time, money, and other resources are needed
to pursue those options?
To answer those questions, lawyers typically help guide their
clients through a logical decision tree of varying complexity
depending on the type of problem under consideration.  Take,
for example, someone consulting a lawyer about a divorce.
Figure 1 illustrates the typical issues that would arise in the
decision-tree analysis.
In most jurisdictions, the number of legal options available to
a client is generally two, and at most three.9 The first option is
to do nothing and stay legally married, which has obvious
implications not only in terms of ongoing animosity (presum-
ably the client is not seeking to dissolve an otherwise happy
marriage) but also restrictions on future relationships (the client
cannot remarry until the existing marriage is legally dissolved)
and continued legal responsibility for the welfare and future
legal obligations incurred by the spouse.  The second option is
to obtain a divorce from a court of competent jurisdiction. A
good lawyer would first discuss with the client the requirements
for filing for divorce, including residency inthe jurisdiction and
satisfaction of any statutorily-defined period of legal separation.
Then the lawyer would discuss obvious implications of divorce
including the need to decide on the disposition of children (cus-
tody, visitation, child support), spousal support, and property
disposition. After
explaining the available
options and their impli-
cations, a lawyer would
typically answer ques-
tions about how to pur-
sue those options, such
as where to file for
divorce (forum selec-
tion) and what steps
may be necessary before
filing (such as legal sepa-
ration, required in some
states).
Finally, the lawyer
would discuss with the client the time, money, and other
resources that would be necessary to pursue each of these
options.  For example, the lawyer would advise the client about
the probability of different outcomes of the divorce decree,
such as the likely range of child or spousal support; the typical
amount of time until the final divorce decree would be issued;
the estimated costs including legal fees, court costs, and related
expenses; the amount of out-of-court preparation required of
the client for collecting relevant documents and affidavits for
necessary witnesses; and the likely number of in-court appear-
ances.
In this scenario, the initial steps are more accurately
described as legal information.  Typically they are stated as pos-
itive law in state statutes and court rules.  It is only in the final
step of providing advice based on the client’s facts that legal
judgment and experience—the hallmarks of the practice of
law—become more prominent and the intrinsic value of a
lawyer becomes more evident.  It is also precisely the kind of
information and advice that people need to make an informed
decision about whether they would be able to represent them-
selves effectively.  Indeed, many self-represented litigants
underestimate the amount of preparation needed for their cases
and, if fully advised of the time and resources involved, might
choose to seek assistance from a lawyer for some or all of the
case.  Obviously, this illustration is fairly straightforward.  In
other types of cases in which the positive law is less clear cut,
the threshold where legal information blurs into legal advice
might occur much earlier in the consultation.
Logistics
Once all the legal options have been explored and one
option agreed upon, the next area of legal expertise for which
clients traditionally rely on lawyers involves carrying out the
myriad of logistical steps necessary to bring the matter within
the legal jurisdiction of the court for consideration.  Other than
the choice of forum (where a choice even exists), knowledge of
these steps mainly consists of legal information rather than
legal judgment.  But carrying out these logistics can involve a
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9. Some jurisdictions, such as Virginia and Kentucky, permit divorce
“from bed and board,” which operates to sever the spouses’ rights
to property acquired after the divorce as well as legal responsibil-
ity for liability incurred by the former spouse, but does not per-
mit either spouse to remarry and does not affect inheritance rights
(e.g. , dower, curtesy).
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staggering number of
individual steps: drafting
pleadings, including all
accompanying forms and
affidavits; filing the
pleadings with the court;
paying the court fees or
applying for a waiver for
indigent litigants; arrang-
ing for service of process,
either through the court,
with the sheriff, or with a
private process server;
fulfilling any mandatory
requirements to proceed,
such as attending a parenting class or mandatory mediation; fil-
ing supplemental papers (separation agreement, financial affi-
davits); and then taking any formal steps needed to set the case
on the calendar.  After becoming aware of how tedious some of
the steps can be, litigants who can afford to do so may opt to
have a lawyer carry out some or all of these tasks, but there is
little about these steps that requires the level of legal judgment
that clients would ordinarily only receive from an experienced
lawyer.
Strategies
After arranging for the logistics of a civil claim, the next
step involves deciding on a strategy with which to pursue or
defend the claim.  The two most common strategies are to
negotiate the dispute and try to arrive at a mutually agreeable
settlement or to prepare for formal litigation before a judge or
other judicial officer.  As a practical matter, this decision is
strongly tied to the litigant’s objectives concerning the case.
The litigant obviously has superior knowledge of his or her
own objectives, and those preferences should ordinarily be
given great deference by the lawyer.10 But the decision also
relies heavily on the lawyer’s judgment about which course of
action would best secure the client’s objectives, so there is a
great deal of added value from the information and advice a
competent lawyer can impart.
One common misconception by many self-represented liti-
gants is that, once they have filed their case, the court takes full
responsibility for future decisions on the merits of the case.
Few self-represented litigants realize that the vast majority of
cases are disposed of through a bilateral agreement of the par-
ties (settlement) or a unilateral decision by one of the parties
(default judgment or dismissal for failure to prosecute), not by
a trial on the merits.  Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the col-
lective body of law referred to as civil procedure exists largely
to prepare for trial, an event that very rarely happens.  Judges,
of course, are well aware that if full judicial review of the facts
and the law was required to resolve each case, the civil justice
system would come to a grinding halt in a matter of days.
There is an implicit expectation that parties will continue to
negotiate with one another even after the case has been filed,
hopefully arriving at some mutually agreeable arrangement
that will alleviate the need for the court to expend time and
effort deciding the case, or at least restrict that effort to a review
of the agreement to ensure that it meets minimum legal
requirements (e.g., child support, visitation).  
Unfortunately, there are few mechanisms to inform self-rep-
resented litigants about this implicit expectation.
Consequently, many self-represented litigants are unaware that
they retain the ability to formulate their own resolution, and
indeed that their resolution might be more advantageous to
both parties than any that the court might impose.  Although
some courts have implemented mandatory mediation or other
alternative dispute resolution programs that provide an oppor-
tunity to inform self-represented litigants about the possibility
of a negotiated disposition, and even provide a structured
forum for conducting the negotiations, not all do so.
If self-represented litigants are largely unaware that they can
negotiate rather than litigate their cases, they are also unin-
formed of what they must do to prepare for litigation.  Most
self-represented litigants work under the misconception that a
hearing is their first opportunity to tell their side of the story.
The reality is that, for many, it is their last.  Lawyers, of course,
understand the importance of preparation, which involves the
factual and legal documentation of the case.  Exchanging inter-
rogatories, conducting depositions to discover factual informa-
tion under the control of the opposing party, and issuing sub-
poenas to compel witness appearances are all part of trial
preparation.  As a practical matter, however, most cases involv-
ing self-represented litigants do not generally require a great
deal of discovery or legal preparation in that they tend to be
factually and legally quite straight forward.  Another compo-
nent of preparation is learning the niceties of court presenta-
tion, such as court etiquette (e.g., how to address the judge and
how to address the opposing counsel or party, if at all) and trial
logistics (e.g., the order of trial, how to get documentary or
demonstrative evidence admitted, how to frame questions to
witnesses on direct and cross-examination).
Both negotiation and preparation for trial are skills that
lawyers acquire with training and experience, but they are not
solely dependent on legal judgment.  Some self-represented lit-
igants can represent their interests quite well in negotiations,
perhaps even better than lawyers, if they are only informed of
the benefits of doing so.  Trial preparation is another thing
entirely.  Many self-represented litigants are understandably
intimidated by the courtroom environment and are uncomfort-
able with the formality of trial procedure.  Although some do
reasonably well with coaching from a seasoned legal profes-
sional, limited representation for in-court proceedings is
another task for which many litigants would be willing to pay
reasonable legal fees.
Resolution and Enforcement
In spite of the complexity of the trial process, a commend-
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able number of self-represented litigants prevail in their cases
each year.  Some of those cases are largely administrative pro-
ceedings that require little more than dogged determination
and perseverance.  In other cases, self-represented litigants
demonstrate a remarkable degree of legal sophistication despite
their lack of formal legal education and training.  Even so, one
of the biggest stumbling blocks takes place when the judge
issues an oral judgment in favor of a self-represented litigant,
and then turns to the litigant and requests him or her to com-
mit the judgment to writing and submit it to the court for the
judge’s signature—which leads back to the logistical problem of
drafting court documents.  There are few templates or model
court forms that a self-represented litigant can examine to get
an idea of what a written order might look like, much less what
should be included in it.  Many self-represented litigants, even
though they have won their cases, lack knowledge about how
to translate the judge’s oral statement into a binding and
enforceable written instrument—if, indeed, they have thor-
oughly understood the judge’s oral judgment.
Even for cases in which the court drafts its own final orders,
self-represented litigants are rarely knowledgeable about how
to enforce these judgments in any meaningful way.  Thus per-
petuates the myth of the self-enforcing judgment in which,
magically, the judgment-debtor pays the full amount of the
debt, mortgage and finance companies are notified that a newly
divorced person is no longer obligated on a previously jointly-
held note, etc.  Some self-represented litigants believe that the
court pays the judgment, then collects from the judgment-
debtor.  Rarely are self-represented litigants given any informa-
tion about their options for enforcing a judgment (e.g., lien or
seizure of assets, garnishment), which brings them back to the
beginning of the litigation cycle again: diagnosis of their legal
options and the associated implications, the logistics of
enforcement, and the most effective strategies and resolutions.
From an examination of the specific legal tasks involved in
pursuing litigation, it becomes clear that access to legal infor-
mation is the most critical need of self-represented litigants in
the vast majority of cases.  Legal judgment—the reasonable
inferences that an experienced legal professional makes based
on available information—can be critical to litigants in more
complicated cases in which the sheer volume and complexity
of legal information requires more time than the average
layperson can commit to preparing his or her own case.  But in
less complex cases, self-represented litigants are typically able
to make reasonable inferences from legal information, and thus
the need for access to legal advice can be very helpful, but is
not absolutely necessary.  The question then becomes who is
best situated to provide accurate legal information to self-rep-
resented litigants, and to encourage litigants to seek legal
advice in appropriate circumstances.
WHAT COURTS AND
LAWYERS CAN DO
Ethical constraints on
judges, court staff, and
lawyers mandate some sep-
aration of the spheres of
assistance that can be
offered to self-represented
litigants.  Judges and court
staff operate under require-
ments of neutrality and
objectivity, and lawyers
operate under requirements
of competence and the
avoidance of conflicts.  But
there is no inherent ethical
restriction on cooperation between the courts and the legal
community in providing services that would meet the needs of
self-represented litigants in a more-or-less seamless manner.11
So how can courts and legal service providers address each of
the categories described above to improve access to justice for
self-represented litigants?
Much of the decision-tree analysis that takes place during
diagnosis relies on legal information, rather than legal advice,
meaning that either the court or the legal community could eth-
ically provide this information, and many do.  A popular
approach for many courts is to provide model court forms and
instructions for the most common types of cases, such as
divorce (with or without children), child support initiation and
modification, and small claims.  The biggest problem arises in
the context of how to help self-represented litigants evaluate
their legal options, including the option to proceed without
legal representation.  Some courts have addressed this dilemma
through collaborations with the local legal community to pro-
vide consultation services for a nominal fee (e.g., $25 for a half-
hour consultation) on an unbundled basis as part of the courts’
assistance programs for self-represented litigants.  Self-repre-
sented litigants get the advantage of early consultation with a
lawyer, and lawyers have an opportunity for future business if
the litigant chooses to hire a lawyer to handle some or all of the
case.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, has
taken this approach a step further.  Part of the lawyer’s consul-
tation12 involves an assessment of case complexity as well as
the self-represented litigant’s emotional and intellectual ability
to represent him or herself, and a formal recommendation
about whether to proceed without a lawyer or not.  (The vast
majority of litigants—well over 90%—are given the green light
to proceed pro se.)  The Maryland Legal Assistance Network
has also developed a technology application that provides a
self-assessment tool for would-be self-represented litigants.13
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Finally, most courts would be reluctant (and rightly so) to
make predictions about cases filed by self-represented litigants
(e.g., how long before a final decision is made, what will the
outcome be).  But there is no reason why courts cannot make
general information available that could help self-represented
litigants gauge such things for themselves (e.g., average filing-
to-disposition times for uncontested divorce cases, average
number of court appearances).  Many courts collect this infor-
mation routinely for caseload management purposes, and
there is no apparent reason that it could not be provided to the
public.  
Addressing the logistics of self-representation is more chal-
lenging, since the actual process of initiating and carrying out
litigation in most courts is extremely complex for persons with-
out training or experience in civil procedure.  Although the
purpose of court procedure is to preserve the rights of litigants
and to manage court caseloads efficiently, procedures that were
created to address new situations or types of cases often accu-
mulate in ways that are internally inconsistent or that obscure
the underlying purpose of those procedures.  Take, for exam-
ple, process requirements concerning who can serve court
papers on litigants.  In the early days of the U.S. Postal Service,
when timely delivery of the mail was less reliable than it is
today, most courts required service of process to be performed
by law enforcement or professional process servers to ensure
that litigants actually received notice of the suit and could tes-
tify to that effect if necessary.  Since then, of course, postal ser-
vice has improved dramatically and many courts now explicitly
permit service of process by first-class or registered mail.  Case
law in some states provides that actual notice is sufficient even
if the litigant has not adhered to formal service procedures.  All
too frequently, however, statutes and court rules retain refer-
ences to outmoded procedures and as a result, litigants are led
to believe that the process involves multiple steps, multiple
forms, and sometimes even multiple agencies (e.g., local sher-
iff and private process server).14
The first step, then, to reducing the level of logistical com-
plexity involves evaluating existing procedures to identify the
steps of the process that cause self-represented litigants the
most trouble and to focus on simplifying those steps.  Doing so,
of course, requires judges and court staff to shift their frame of
reference about the cause of problems encountered by self-rep-
resented litigants.  An example from the glory days of the
American railroad helps to illustrate how this frame of refer-
ence affects the efficiency of the overall system.15 In the early
days of the American railroad, head-on collisions of locomo-
tives were a common occurrence, ostensibly due to “operator
error” by signalmen who failed to alert conductors of oncom-
ing rail traffic on the next segment of track.  At some point,
however, the railroad companies changed their frame of refer-
ence from thinking about these accidents as operator error to
thinking about them as system errors.  To address the systemic
problem, they began laying two sets of railroad tracks side by
side, with each set dedicated to trains traveling in a certain
direction, thus eliminating the potential for signalman errors.
Miraculously, the number of operator errors associated with
head-on collisions declined precipitously.
In the context of the civil justice system, the way for courts
to address the logistical problems of self-represented litigants is
to stop thinking of common mistakes as “operator error” and
to begin thinking about how to correct the system errors that
frequently cause operators to fail.  Take, for example, the com-
mon complaint of court staff of having to reschedule hearings
due to failure to arrange for service of process on the opposing
party, either because self-represented litigants didn’t know that
service of process was required or they didn’t understand how
to go about doing it.  Both Delaware and Virginia addressed this
issue by having the court take responsibility for service of
process at the time pleadings are filed.  Court staff there take all
of the information needed to perfect service of process from the
filing party, collect the appropriate fee, and provide the infor-
mation to the appropriate agency.  In most Virginia jurisdic-
tions, the local sheriff serves the papers; in Delaware, the court
has a contract with a private process server.  From the litigant’s
perspective, filing the necessary papers is a one-step process—
there is no need to contact another agency within the court (or
down the street or across town, depending on the location) or
to pay another set of fees.
Another common problem that can addressed through sys-
tem reform is the large proportion of cases that seem to lan-
guish indefinitely because litigants do not know how to move
to the next stage of the litigation process after they have filed
the initial pleadings.  Ultimately, many of these cases are dis-
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14. Moreover, many court procedures carry on long after the condi-
tions that led to their establishment have disappeared because the
costs involved in removing or reforming obsolete systems or pro-
cedures often exceed available funding, especially at the local level.
15. Thanks to Richard Zorza, who often uses this illustration in edu-
cational workshops on self-represented litigation.
missed for failure to prosecute (and are then refiled at some
later date).  Instead of requiring litigants to take some affirma-
tive step to alert the court that the case can proceed, some
courts have made the process self-perpetuating—as soon as the
litigant completes one step in the litigation process, the court
automatically schedules the next step on the court’s calendar
(e.g., registration for parenting classes, mandatory mediation,
pretrial conference).16 A detailed set of instructions about the
next procedural event is given to the litigant with information
about how to request a change to the schedule and the conse-
quences of failing to adhere to the schedule.
As explained above, assessing the dual strategies of negotia-
tion and preparation for litigation requires some degree of legal
judgment, but ultimately must comport with the litigant’s rea-
sonable objectives in pursuing the claim.  Although the assess-
ment itself tends to fall more appropriately to the legal com-
munity, the court can play a role by informing self-represented
litigants that settlement of outstanding disputes is always an
option available to them and by making institutional resources
(e.g., mediation or arbitration services) available that encour-
age settlement.  For litigants who opt to pursue litigation, a
brief pretrial conference with the judge or another court official
provides an opportunity to inform litigants about the court’s
expectations for trial.  Emphasizing the importance of subpoe-
nas for necessary witnesses and bringing all relevant documen-
tation can go a long way to alerting litigants of the importance
of pretrial preparation.
The same lessons about using instances of “operator error”
to identify system errors apply to the resolution and enforce-
ment stages of litigation.  Many cases involving self-represented
litigants require fairly routine final judgments that can easily be
drafted at the bench using preprinted forms or a standardized
template.  Doing so immediately at the end of the hearing will
relieve litigants’ discomfort as well as the potential for delay
and inaccuracy associated with forcing litigants to draft final
orders.  In addition to providing the written judgment, how-
ever, the court should explain the terms of the judgment and
advise self-represented litigants of the procedure to challenge
the judgment (e.g., appeals) or to modify the order if appropri-
ate in the future (e.g., child support).  Doing so in person at the
time of the hearing further emphasizes the finality of the order
and also provides an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings
about specific terms.
Because satisfaction of civil judgments relies heavily on the
cooperation of the judgment-debtor, many courts are reluctant
to offer self-represented litigants assistance with enforcement.  A
Colorado magistrate, however, has found a way to provide self-
represented litigants with information that can later be used to
assess the likelihood of collecting on a judgment and the
options for doing so.  At the end of the hearing, he provides the
litigants with his written judgment and advises the judgment-
debtor of any procedural remedies to challenge the judgment.
But before the judgment-debtor is permitted to leave the court-
room, the magistrate requires him or her to complete a brief set
of interrogatories includ-
ing place of employment
and the location and
account numbers of any
existing assets (e.g., bank
accounts), which is then
given to the judgment-
creditor.  If the parties are
unable to come to some
agreement about how the
debt will be satisfied, the
judgment-creditor already
has in his or her possession sufficient information to decide
whether to pursue legal enforcement of the judgment as well as
the best way to do so (i.e., garnishment, lien, or seizure of
assets).  If the judgment-debtor has no job and no assets, for
example, the judgment-creditor is saved the time and expense
of a probably futile future attempt to satisfy the judgment.
Some judges and lawyers, upon hearing of this practice,
question the propriety of having a magistrate provide assistance
to the judgment-creditor in collecting on the debt.  But the
judges in that court agreed with the magistrate’s explanation
that the practice does not violate judicial ethics of neutrality
because, as soon as he renders the final judgment, he is no
longer neutral with respect to the parties—he has just ruled that
one party wins and the other party loses.  Moreover, the magis-
trate also found the practice to be a significant benefit to the
court in that the amount of post-judgment proceedings to locate
and attach the assets of judgment-debtors declined dramatically.
Again, we see a court that has simplified its process—removing
the necessity for judgment-creditors to seek substantial court
oversight in the collection of debts—in response to the needs of
self-represented litigants.  Further, this change to meet the
needs of self-represented litigants has had a secondary effect of
making the court system itself more efficient.
COLLABORATION FOR SEAMLESS ACCESS TO JUSTICE
This article has focused on three distinct issues related to
self-represented litigation.  The first is that the demand for
affordable legal services has vastly outpaced the available sup-
ply.  Over two decades of efforts to increase access to affordable
legal services has not appreciably improved the situation and is
highly unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.  It should be
no surprise, therefore, that increasing numbers of people
choose self-representation as the only feasible option for secur-
ing necessary legal rights and remedies.  In recognition of the
reality of litigants’ needs, the courts and the legal community
have slowly shifted from insistence on full-representation for
every litigant as a fundamental requirement of equal justice to
a more pragmatic approach, offering information and limited
counsel for those litigants who are capable of managing their
own cases and reserving full-representation for those with more
complex cases or fewer personal resources.
The effect of this shift has been increased awareness of the
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16. In addition to fewer unresolved cases on the docket, many courts
find that their calendar management improves significantly as
well.
distinction between legal information and legal advice that is
inherent in the specific tasks that lawyers traditionally perform
for clients under the general rubric of the “practice of law.”
Much of the value added by a lawyer’s services is the efficiency
derived from the lawyer’s existing knowledge of legal informa-
tion about available options and how to pursue them.  With
access to legal information, many laypersons are capable of per-
forming these tasks for themselves, albeit less efficiently.
Certainly one implication of this awareness has been a dramatic
shift in lawyer-client relationships as clients become more
informed and more insistent on taking an active role in the
management of their cases.  Indeed, a large body of academic
literature has developed that applauds the shift away from a
paternalistic relationship on the lawyer’s part to one of greater
respect for client autonomy.  It is possible that many who sup-
port the evolution of a more coequal lawyer-client relationship
failed to appreciate the implications that it might have in terms
of the mechanics of how lawyers practice law, especially the
increased demand for unbundled legal services, but it is clear
that this model of legal service delivery is becoming more pop-
ular in many parts of the country.
There is one aspect of the needs of self-represented litigants
that can only be addressed by the courts, and that is the com-
plexity of the judicial system itself.  We have seen, for example,
that much of the complexity of the judicial system has been
allowed to perpetuate because lawyers, who had already assim-
ilated information about the underlying basis for court proce-
dure, could navigate the system more deftly and sometimes even
use that information to gain a strategic advantage in litigation.
The influx of large numbers of self-represented litigants who are
unfamiliar with court procedures, however, places unmistakable
burdens not only on the litigants, but also on the courts them-
selves.  Although many judges and court staff express resent-
ment at having to “dumb down” the system to prevent “opera-
tor errors” by self-represented litigants, doing so clearly benefits
all litigants regardless of their representation status as well as
the courts themselves in terms of increased efficiency.   
The remaining dilemma, then, is how best to provide self-
represented litigants with access to accurate legal information,
including referrals to sources of legal advice in appropriate cir-
cumstances.  As a practical matter, who actually provides legal
information is a relatively minor consideration, although the
experience in many jurisdictions is that a collaborative
approach by the courts and the legal community is more effec-
tive than either one acting alone.  In terms of convenience and
a logical starting place for litigants, however, most of these
efforts should be housed within the courts or at least in fairly
close proximity, even if the legal community is the primary
source of information.  This model of collaboration has worked
well in the context of other types of service provision, such as
court-annex mediation or other alternative dispute resolution
programs, so there is little reason to think that it would not
work equally well in terms of assistance programs for self-rep-
resented litigants.  
From the perspective of the litigant, such arrangements pro-
vide relatively seamless access to justice, and do so with greater
efficiency and less awkwardness in preserving the legitimate
separation imposed by ethical constraints for both the courts
and the legal community.  Undoubtedly, the transition from the
traditional framework of full-service legal representation to
new models of access to legal information and legal advice has
been unsettling for the courts and for the legal community.  In
the long run, however, these models provide better access to
justice for far greater numbers of people than was previously
possible and promote better accountability of the courts and
the legal community to the people they serve.
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alcohol was a factor in 38% of fatal crashes and in 7% of all
vehicle crashes.6 In 1998, 1.4 million persons were arrested for
DWI.7
TECHNOLOGY AND DWI
Technology has long been of great importance in DWI cases.
Alcohol was proven to be statistically related to fatal automo-
bile crashes by the “Manhattan Study.”8 Studies of the associa-
tion between degree of impairment and the amount of alcohol
that is present in a person’s system have concluded that even
low doses of alcohol will impair one’s visual perceptions and
reaction times.9
Without the use of some form of test to ascertain alcohol
levels in defendants, the court must rely entirely upon evidence
of the defendant’s demeanor.  In cases of obvious intoxication,
demeanor evidence may be sufficient, but impairment may be
more difficult to establish from demeanor evidence alone. 
The earliest tests for measuring blood-alcohol content were
based upon venous blood samples.  Alcohol, present in the
breath of subjects, was determined to have a correlation with
alcohol levels in venous blood.  As a result, in 1953, the
National Safety Council Committee on Alcohol and Drugs rec-
ommended that breath testing be used in drunken driving
cases.10 The first breath-testing device was the “Breathalyzer,”
which was developed by Robert Borkenstein in 1954. It is
cheaper and much more convenient for a police officer to
administer a breath test than to transport a suspect to a hospi-
tal or clinic for a blood test. Breath testing soon became the
most predominant method of ascertaining the level of alcohol
in a suspect’s system.11 The breath test is now so common that
nearly all DWI cases rely heavily on the results of the testing
device used in the local jurisdiction.
The passage of “per se” DWI laws based entirely upon a per-
son’s BAC have made testing devices even more common as an
investigatory and evidentiary tool.
Technology is becoming an increasingly pervasive aspect ofthe criminal justice system.  One of the earliest techno-logical innovations in the investigation of crimes was the
use of fingerprints for identification of suspects.1
Fingerprinting began as an investigatory tool and by the early
20th century was accepted as scientific evidence in court pro-
ceedings.2
Courts now increasingly rely upon expert witnesses to
explain scientific evidence, which is often critical in the deci-
sion-making process for criminal and civil courts.3 While tech-
nology has routinely been utilized as both investigatory and
evidentiary devices, only in the last decade has a technological
device made the transition from investigation to evidence to
sentencing element.  The breath-analyzed ignition interlock is
the device that has experienced this metamorphosis. 
Drunken driving emerged as a new crime in the 20th cen-
tury.  DWI was unknown at common law.  With the develop-
ment of the automobile in the dawn of the last century, the
predilection for the fruit of the vine of some members of soci-
ety combined dangerously with this new mechanized mode of
travel.  
By the 1970s the streets and highways of America were
plagued by drivers who were too impaired to safely handle a
vehicle.  Enforcement of DWI laws was, at best, spotty.  In the
early 1980s, activist groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD) began organizing and pushing for reforms in
the approach to DWI.  Simultaneously, legislatures began
proposing and passing new legislation aimed at the DWI prob-
lem.4 As a result of a combination of this change in public
opinion, more serious enforcement, and expanded penalties,
the arrest rate fell from 1,124 per 100,000 drivers in 1986, to
809 per 100,000 in 1997.5 This is a 28% decrease in the DWI
arrest rate.  But there are still a substantial number of impaired
drivers on the roads.  Even with this decrease, alcohol plays a
role in far too many motor vehicle crashes.  The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported that in 1999,
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THE IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE
It is not a great leap from the development of testing devices
to determine blood alcohol level in a person, to the application
of this technology to design “a car that drunks can’t drive.”12
The use of breath-testing equipment for preventative purposes
has been under consideration since 1970.13 Early vehicle-
based breath-testing devices were plagued by problems with
reliability and circumvention.14 A frequent means of cheating
the early ignition interlock devices was the use of stored breath
samples by drivers.  When the technology was improved so as
to effectively prevent circumvention, the stage was set for the
widespread usage of the modern ignition interlock system.
The ignition interlock is typically a handheld device that is
wired to a control unit under the dash of the vehicle.  The dri-
ver must give a breath sample that has alcohol below a prede-
termined level.  If the driver produces a sample above the pro-
grammed limit, the ignition system of the vehicle is shut down
and the vehicle will not start.  The unit is programmed to allow
another attempt after a certain amount of time (usually 30
minutes) has elapsed.15
Circumvention may be prevented by requiring a “hum-
tone” at the same time the sample is given.  That is, the driver
must hum and blow at the same time.  Also required are
“rolling re-tests,” which keep drivers from having a sober
friend provide the initial sample.  Circumvention is further dis-
couraged by the use of a data recorder, which stores informa-
tion about each time there is an attempt to start the vehicle.
The data includes date, time, subject’s BAC, any lock-out
events, and any attempts to bypass the interlock unit.16 The
offender must report at regular intervals for the unit to be
inspected and the data downloaded.  The information is pro-
vided to—and should be reviewed by—the offender’s proba-
tion officer or the court.
California was the first state to enact legislation that autho-
rized sentencing judges to require the installation of ignition
interlock devices in the vehicles of DWI offenders.17 As of 2002,
41 states and the District of Columbia had passed laws autho-
rizing the use of the ignition
interlock.18 Some backers of the
ignition interlock have suggested
that the device be made another
piece of mandatory automotive
safety equipment along with seat
belts and airbags.19
DWI CASES AND THEORIES
OF PUNISHMENT
Criminologists and researchers recognize four general pur-
poses or goals served by the punishment of actions that society
has deemed beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior: (1) ret-
ribution, (2) rehabilitation or reform, (3) incapacitation, and
(4) deterrence.20 Which of these four functions of punishment
are effective in the handling of drunken driving cases?  
Retribution
Retribution serves primarily to satisfy the urge to avenge the
wrongful behavior of those who violate society’s rules of con-
duct.  From that standpoint, the punishment must only be pro-
portionate to the offense in order to be effective.  Preventing or
deterring future criminal behavior is collateral to the retributive
theory of punishment.
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation operates upon the presumption that there is
something “wrong” with criminals—that they suffer from some
form of sickness, which causes their aberrant behavior.
Rehabilitative programs began to be used extensively in the
United States for DWI offenders in the period of the 1970s and
early 1980s.  It has been reported, however, that these programs
had only minimal beneficial effects upon recidivism,21 though
Lucker and Osti22 caution that it is inaccurate to draw general-
izations from the applicable studies because of the broad variety
of penalties, rehabilitation programs, and offenders that were
considered.  
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tion interlock operates independently of this rational choice.
The motivation of the driver is irrelevant.  Even if the subject,
after making the choice to drive a motor vehicle after drinking
alcohol, tries to drive, the ignition interlock will not allow the
crime to be committed.
It has been observed that the deterrent effects of punishment
for DWI are greatly reduced by the almost minimal risk of
detection of offenders by law enforcement.27 The perceived risk
of arrest has a direct relationship to the numbers of persons
who drink and drive.  A greater perceived risk of detection and
punishment to the potential offender will produce fewer occur-
rences of drinking and driving.28 There is no certainty that an
impaired driver will be stopped and arrested.  Regardless of
how severe the ultimate sentence may be, many persons will
take their chances on the road because of the slim chance of
being apprehended.
Each of the elements of deterrence interacts with one
another.  For example, even when an offense carries an
extremely harsh punishment, if the certainty of detection and
punishment is low, then there is little deterrent effect.
Similarly, if the certainty of detection and punishment is high,
and the punishment is also considered severe, but the process
is extraordinarily slow, then the deterrent effect is lessened by
this lack of celerity of punishment.29
Recidivism is related to specific deterrence.  If the theory of
deterrence is valid, then the affected offender should exhibit
less criminal behavior and a lower rate of future involvement
with the criminal justice system.  Incarceration of DWI offend-
ers has not been proven to be any more effective at reducing
future DWI offenses than other legal sanctions.30
DOES IT WORK? RECIDIVISM STUDIES
A recent study of recidivism rates of DWI offenders who
were required to use the ignition interlock was conducted in
northeast Arkansas.31 This study compared offenders in
Greene County, Arkansas, which utilized the interlock, with
DWI offenders in neighboring Craighead County, which did
not include the interlock in DWI sentences.  The Greene
County interlock group consisted of all DWI offenders in the
District Court for the period from May 1, 1995 through June
30, 1996.  There were 315 DWI offenders in this group.  The
Craighead County non-interlock group consisted of all DWI
offenders in the Craighead County District Court between
January 1 and June 30, 1996, a group that included 312 persons
convicted of DWI.32 The Arkansas Office of Driver Control
provided histories for all offenders in these two groups for
Other studies have shown
quite contrary results.
Specifically, an examination of
a treatment program used in
lieu of a mandatory jail sen-
tence for first-time DWI
offenders demonstrated that
offenders who went through
this alternative program expe-
rienced a rate of recidivism
that was almost one-half that
of offenders who received the
traditional jail sentence.  The
jailed offenders had a 37% recidivism rate while the offenders
who were sentenced to the alternative program had only a 19%
rate of re-offending.23
Incapacitation
The most severe form of incapacitation is incarceration.  In
the context of drunken driving, the punishment is effective
because it keeps the offender off the road.  But this efficacy is
true only while the offender is incarcerated.  Other less restric-
tive, but still effective, forms of incapacitative punishment are
the utilization of ignition interlock devices, confiscation of
vehicles, and suspension or revocation of driving privileges.24
An effective form of incapacitation of impaired drivers is the
suspension or revocation of driving privileges.  One study has
found that DWI offenders who have had their license sus-
pended or revoked have fewer subsequent violations and fewer
crashes.25 It is quite important to note that many of these
offenders are still driving even though their right to drive has
been taken away.  While they violate the requirement that they
not drive, they are apparently doing so with some degree of
restraint and caution.  This increased level of highway safety
and defensive driving is very likely to have some positive bear-
ing on the number of motor vehicle crashes, alcohol related or
not, that occur on the streets and highways.
Deterrence
The fourth purpose of punishment is deterrence. This pun-
ishment goal can be directed toward the individual offender in
the form of specific deterrence, or to society as a whole in the
form of general deterrence.26 Deterrence theory is based upon
the presumption that people make rational choices before they
act, consciously weighing the potential benefits of certain
behaviors against the potential costs of the behavior.  The igni-
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three years subsequent to the subjects’ conviction dates for the
DWI offenses in the respective courts.33
The Greene County offenders were ordered to install an
interlock in their vehicles for periods of either six months or
one year.  This requirement was also made a restriction on
their driver’s licenses for the court-ordered time period.34 The
three-year follow-up provided an opportunity to examine
recidivism well after the time that the interlock was in place in
the offenders’ vehicles.
If reduction in future arrests is one of the goals of a sen-
tencing judge, then recidivism must be examined.  In the
Arkansas study, the interlock group experienced three-year
recidivism rates of 17.5%, compared with 25.3% rates in the
non-interlock group.35 Length of time for use of the interlock
did not appear to make any difference in recidivism.  The rates
were nearly identical for the interlock offenders who were
ordered to use the interlock for six months and the twelve-
month interlock subjects.36
The study revealed more significant differences between the
interlock and non-interlock groups when controlling for other
variables.  Multiple DWI offenders in the interlock group had
re-offense rates of 18.1% compared with recidivism rates of
36.9% for the non-interlock group.37 The interlock subjects
then, were less than half as likely to have a subsequent DWI
conviction within three years.  For first offenders, the differ-
ence was much less substantial.  The interlock group first
offenders had three-year recidivism rates of 17.2% compared
with 21.1% for the non-interlock group.38 This is a very minor
improvement, and was not statistically significant.39
Age also made a difference in future DWI convictions for
the two groups.  Interlock offenders under 30 had three-year
recidivism rates of 12.2%.  The under-30 non-interlock group
had recidivism rates of 23.3%.  For the over-30 offenders,
19.8% of the interlock group had another DWI conviction
within three years, compared with 27.1% of the non-interlock
group.40 To summarize this data,
Selective utilization of the interlock appears to pro-
duce much more substantial results than across-the-
board use.  Offenders under 30 years of age in the non-
interlock group had nearly twice the recidivism rate
than the interlock group members in the same age
group.  The most important variable is prior DWI his-
tory.  The offenders who had previously been convicted
of DWI in the interlock group were less than half as
likely to receive another DWI within three years than
the multi-offenders in the non-interlock group.41
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A Maryland study also
found statistically signifi-
cant reductions in recidi-
vism by multiple offend-
ers who installed inter-
lock devices in vehicles.42
The Maryland study
found that 5.9% of the
offenders in the interlock
group were arrested for
an alcohol-related traffic
offense compared with 9.1% of the offenders in the non-inter-
lock group.43 The Maryland study included random assignment
of offenders who had applied for reinstatement of license privi-
leges to the interlock or non-interlock groups.  The fact that all
subjects in this study had requested license reinstatement may
result in some self-selection bias.  The Maryland subjects were
all motivated to at least try to obtain a license.  Thus, this group
did not include those offenders who had rejected this attempt to
improve their lot.  The Arkansas study included all DWI offend-
ers in the subject jurisdictions.  
The Maryland study was only a two-year follow-up, but was
consistent with the Arkansas study in showing statistically sig-
nificant reductions in recidivism for offenders who were
required to use an ignition interlock.  The Arkansas study had
14.6% recidivism after two years for the interlock group and
21.8% recidivism for the non-interlock group.44 One must also
keep in mind that the Maryland study examined only multiple
offenders, while the Arkansas study looked at first offenders
and multiple offenders.  While there are clear differences in
methodology between these two studies, both reveal signifi-
cant reductions in recidivism by multiple DWI offenders.
An early interlock study in Ohio found recidivism rates
were three times higher for offenders who received a license
suspension compared with offenders placed in an interlock
group.45 The Ohio study examined a population of eligible
DWI offenders in Hamilton County, Ohio.  Offenders were eli-
gible for the interlock if they had a DWI offense were a repeat
offender with two or more DWIs in the last 10 years; or a first
offender who had a BAC of .20 or higher; or refused to take a
breath test at the time of arrest.46
The Ohio study indicated overall recidivism rates that were
much lower than in the Arkansas study.  After 30 months, only
1.5% of the Ohio interlock subjects were rearrested, compared
to 16.1% of the non-interlock group.47 After 36 months, the
Arkansas interlock group of multiple offenders had a recidi-
The study revealed 
. . . significant 
differences between
the interlock and non-
interlock groups when
controlling for other
variables.
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vism rate of 18.1% compared to 36.9% for the non-interlock
group.48
Differences in research design of these three examinations
of recidivism rates and the ignition interlock make a compari-
son of the three studies extremely difficult.  Even so, all three
studies indicated a reduction in future DWIs through use of
the ignition interlock.  Based on these studies, the ignition
interlock is statistically proven to significantly decrease future
DWIs for multiple offenders, younger offenders, and high-risk
offenders, such as those with high BAC levels or those who
refused to be administered a breath test at the time of arrest.
PROBLEMS
The ignition interlock is not a perfect response to impaired
drivers.  As mentioned above, there is the opportunity for
offenders to circumvent the system, if they are willing to risk
dealing with a probation officer or the court.  The interlock is
specific to a particular vehicle, not a particular person.  Thus,
if an offender who is required to use an interlock has other per-
sons in the household, then all of the other household mem-
bers who drive that vehicle will have to contend with using the
interlock on that vehicle—and the offender might still drive by
using a different car.
There are some interlock devices that are not specific to
alcohol, and can produce false positives from cigarette
smoke.49 A false positive prevents the driver from being able
to use the vehicle for that period of time, which unfairly causes
a hardship on the offender or family members.  
Privacy issues have also been raised due to the data collec-
tion features of ignition interlock devices.50 The data collected
include all attempted starts, lock-outs, and BAC levels.  This
data will be collected regardless of who has been driving the
vehicle.  
Would society be willing to make the ignition interlock a
mandatory piece of equipment for all motor vehicles?
Universal use of the interlock has been suggested as a means of
further reducing the still staggering number of traffic fatalities
that are related to drunken driving.51
SUMMARY
Ignition interlock, as with many sentencing options, fea-
tures both positive and negative aspects.  The device has been
proven in empirical studies to reduce recidivism for repeat
DWI offenders, young drivers, and persons with very high
BAC levels.  These reductions are substantial, and statistically
significant. 
The interlock is effective in preventing future violations
even when the particular offenders have difficulty in control-
ling their own behavior.  The interlock does not rely upon
motivation or cooperation by the offender.  It operates to pre-
vent the offending behavior by intervening between the
offender and the vehicle.  It does not stop the person from
drinking.  It does not stop the person from driving.  It only
stops the person from drinking and driving in the vehicle
equipped with an interlock.  It thus, controls the “intersecting
risk behaviors” of drinking and driving.52
Society has made great strides in overcoming the problem of
impaired drivers on the roadway.  But with almost 1.5 million
DWI arrests each year, there is still much room for continued
improvement.  The ignition interlock device is not the sole
response to DWI, but it clearly has established itself as one
more valid option for consideration by sentencing judges in
DWI cases.
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Why should a bank robber in California get a differentsentence than a bank robber in Texas? This was therallying cry behind the legislative implementation
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The Senate Judiciary
Committee found that a major source of the astounding varia-
tions in federal sentencing for identical crimes was the “judge
factor.”1 Federal judges had the discretion to select a sentence
from anywhere within a broad statutory range for each offense.
The judge had the sole responsibility of assessing each indi-
vidual offender and deciding where, within that broad range,
the offender should receive a sentence.  As a result, sentences
issued for the same offense differed dramatically, depending on
the judge who handed down the sentence.
The congressional response to the dilemma of disparate sen-
tencing was the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines
Reform Act of 1984.2 The legislation passed 85 to 3 in the
Senate and 316 to 91 in the House of Representatives.3 The
broad bipartisan support for the Act suggests that the objective
of eliminating unwarranted judicial sentencing disparity was
an admirable and respectable goal that encompassed the con-
cerns of the nation as a whole.  
The Act provided for the creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission, a novel federal rule-making agency.
The Sentencing Commission was charged with the develop-
ment of a sentencing range for each class of convicted persons
based both on the offense and the offender.  The Sentencing
Commission accomplished this task with the establishment of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a set of guiding principles
that were expected to promote a more deliberate, fair, and
rational sentencing process than had previously existed in fed-
eral sentencing.4 The “judge factor” was, thus, narrowly con-
fined as the range of possible sentences was strictly defined
and allowed for very little judicial discretion. 
As stated earlier, the proclaimed goal of the Guidelines was
to eliminate disparity and create truth in sentencing.  It was
not intended to serve as a cure-all to every judicial inequality
that lies within the criminal justice system.  Supporters of the
Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines, however, may
have naively assumed that such a miraculous judicial recon-
struction would be a natural consequence of the 1984 enact-
ment.  The system of rules and procedure even lends an
appearance of having been constructed on the basis of service
and technocratic expertise, giving it a threshold credibility to a
general public not familiar with its actual contours and opera-
tion.5 In reality, a new and equally devastating sentencing dis-
parity has evolved with the implementation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which can no longer be attributed to
the “judge factor.”  
Though originally created to produce a more equitable sen-
tencing scheme, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have had
the opposite effect and become a major source of societal per-
petration of racial inequality.  The question that originally
sparked legislative outrage and subsequent action in the realm
of federal sentencing has been answered:  Why should a bank
robber in California get a different sentence than a bank robber in
Texas?  He shouldn’t! A new question has arisen under the
Guidelines, however, one that demands a response:  Why
should a black drug offender in America receive a different sen-
tence than a white drug offender?
I. HOW THE GUIDELINES WORK
Federal judges are statutorily required to sentence defen-
dants according to the Sentencing Guidelines.  A typical case is
governed by the sentencing table, which prescribes sentencing
ranges in months of imprisonment.  A sentence is derived by
intersecting the offender’s criminal history and the level of the
offense.  Federal judges must now engage in complex numeri-
cal calculations before imposing a sentence under the
Guidelines.6 Chapter three of the Guidelines allows for judi-
cial adjustments to the base level for certain aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, such as victim impact, the offender’s
role in the offense, obstruction, multiple counts, and the
offender’s acceptance of responsibility.7
Following a guilty verdict or plea, a United States probation
officer will conduct an independent pre-sentence investigation
of a defendant and issue a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) to aid the
court in a sentence determination.  The PSR is also provided to
the Assistant U.S. Attorney prior to sentencing and any objec-
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tions concerning factual disputes and applicable Guidelines
issues must be resolved between the two government agents
before a final PSR is given to the court.8 Also, a sentencing
court is required to consider “all acts and omissions . . . that
were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan as the offense of  conviction.”9 This designation includes
conduct that was not formally charged, as well as offense con-
duct that was charged in the indictment, but for which the
defendant was actually acquitted.   
Another major consequence of the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act is the evolution of mandatory mini-
mum sentences.  These sentences can greatly affect the sen-
tence imposed on a defendant.  Congress has set mandatory
minimum sentences for more than 100 crimes.10 In practice,
only four statutes are used with any type of regularity, all cov-
ering drug and weapon offenses.11 These four statutes appear
to be responsible for 94% of all federal mandatory minimum
cases.12 Mandatory sentences require offenders to serve their
entire sentence without parole.  “Mandatory minimum sen-
tences trump the guideline ranges.”13 Where the sentencing
table places the low end of the sentencing range below the
mandatory minimum, the court must follow the mandatory
minimum sentence.  Unless the government moves to depart
below the statutory mandatory minimum, the court has no
authority to do so.  
II. THE PROBLEM
There is great irony in the fact that the original, motivating
purpose behind sentencing reform was the elimination of dis-
criminatory “disparity” in sentencing, yet racial and class
inequalities in sentencing under the Guidelines persist.  The
Guidelines have, in a sense, created a bifurcation of society
between “We the people” and “We the other people.”16 The
sentencing reformers of the 1984 Congress attempted to ratio-
nally and reasonably solve an imperative governmental prob-
lem, but like the civil-rights hydra of the 1950s, many more
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ILLUSTRATION 1
Defendant, Jamaal, pled guilty under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B) to two counts pursuant to a
plea agreement: conspiracy to possess crack with intent to dis-
tribute, involving over 500 grams of crack cocaine; and distri-
bution of crack.  
In preparing the PSR, the probation officer first computes
the base offense level predicated on the offense conduct
described by the Assistant U.S. Attorney.  The base offense
level is 36 because Jamaal possessed over 500 grams of crack
with the intent to distribute, and there are no specific aggra-
vating offense characteristics, such as possession of a firearm,
to factor in.  Then the probation officer has to determine
whether any other adjustments are mandated under the five
sub-parts of chapter three of the Act: (A) victim-related adjust-
ments; (B) role in the offense; (C) obstruction of justice; (D)
multiple counts; and (E) acceptance of responsibility.  In
Jamaal’s case, there are no adjustments to be made.  Because
Jamaal pled guilty he receives a three-level downward adjust-
ment for acceptance of responsibility, so his total offense level
is 33.
Jamaal’s criminal history category is I, because he has no
prior convictions.  Looking at the sentencing grid, which has
criminal history categories along one axis and the offense lev-
els along the other, a judge must conclude that for an offense
level of 33 and a criminal history of I, the sentencing range is
135-168 months (approximately 11 to 14 years).14
ILLUSTRATION 2
Defendant, Johnnie, also pled guilty under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B) to three counts pursuant to a
plea agreement: conspiracy to import cocaine, involving more
than 500 grams of cocaine; conspiracy to possess cocaine with
an intent to distribute; and distribution of cocaine.  
In Johnnie’s case, the base level at which the probation offi-
cer will arrive at for conspiracy to import more than 500 grams
of cocaine is 26.  Once again, no specific offense characteris-
tics are present.  In the “adjustments” stage of the process,
however, the probation officer will adjust the base offense level
with a three-level increase for the role Johnnie played in the
offense, pursuant to Guidelines section 3B1.1(b), because he
was a was a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity, which
was otherwise extensive, and reaches a subtotal of 29.
However, because Johnnie also pled guilty he receives a three-
level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, so
his total offense level remains at 26.
Johnnie’s criminal history category is II, because he has
three prior convictions.  Looking at the sentencing grid crim-
inal history axis and cross referencing that number with the
offense level axis, a judge must conclude that for an offense
level of 26 and a criminal history of II, the sentencing range is
70-87 months (approximately 5 to 7 years).15
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sentencing problems have
come forth to take the place
of judicial disparity.
A. Incarceration and
Prosecutorial Sentencing
The figures boasted by the
United States on current per
capita incarceration rate sta-
tistical charts are astound-
ingly high.17 Billions of dol-
lars have been and are being
diverted from educational programs to pay the costs of build-
ing and operating a burgeoning number of prisons and jails.18
The United States has seen an explosion in numbers of federal
offenders and an enormous financial burden has been placed
on taxpayers.  Judges find the fact that judicial power has been
totally shifted and now lies in the hands of aggressive prosecu-
tors to be a “scary notion” because prosecutors are hired with-
out the careful scrutiny given to federal judges.19 As a result,
federal judges frequently find themselves imposing sentences
that they wholly disagree with and feel are unjust.20
A fundamental United States principle, illustrated by the
founding fathers’ implementation of a system of checks and
balances, is that it is unwise to leave such power “unchecked
in the hands of anyone, least of all in the hands of men and
women whose decisions are made in the privacy of their
offices, who are caught up in an adversarial role, and whose
public function often serves as a stepping stone to higher polit-
ical or judicial office.”21 In an intense critique of the
Guidelines, Judge J. Lawrence Irving of San Diego commented
upon his retirement, “If I remain on the bench, I have no
choice but to follow the law.  I just can’t, in good conscience,
continue to do this.”22
B. Racial Disparity
One major dilemma that has arisen and continues to tear at
the social fabric of whole communities is the racial disparity
perpetrated under the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The percentage of black men in both state and federal prison is
considerably higher than that of white men, even though blacks
are only 12% of the male population.23 Statistics show that, on
any given day, one in three black men aged 20 to 29 is in prison
or jail, on probation, or on parole.24 Thus, there are more
young black men in prison than there are in colleges across this
nation.25 Governmental statistics show that black people rep-
resent about 14% of the nation’s drug users, yet make up 35%
of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of those convicted
for drug possession, and 74% of those sentenced to serve
time.26 A recent report indicated that young Hispanic males
have a one in six chance of spending time in prison.27 In fact,
the percentage of federal Hispanic prisoners grew 219%
between 1985 and 1995, making Hispanics the fastest growing
category of prisoners.28 The percentage of federal Asian
American prisoners also increased by a factor of four between
1980 to 1999.29 Federal drug sentencing in the U.S. appears to
purport a lofty goal of disparity elimination while, at the same
time, creating yet another head on the hydra of racial injustice.
C. Perpetration of Racial Discrimination
The Guidelines have also served as an indirect source of the
perpetration of racial discrimination in other areas.  As young
African-Americans continue to be disproportionately sen-
tenced, the perception that most African-Americans are
deviant and serve as the primary source of crime in this coun-
try becomes more prevalent in the mind of the white majority.
In reality, whites commit drug crimes, too, but police enforce-
ment strategies do not focus on white neighborhoods.30 Drug
arrests are simply easier to accomplish in impoverished inner-
city neighborhoods than in stable middle-class neighborhoods. 
It has been said that simply to make it through the day,
blacks pay a psychic tax.31 Members of all classes of African-
Americans, middle-class, working-class, and the poverty-
stricken, often and perhaps increasingly agree on this point.
When you see a fellow black man get stopped by the police,
you wonder how race figured into it.  When you go into a store
and the sales people give you an extra bit of scrutiny, you won-
der.  When you’re on an elevator and it stops at a floor and the
white woman waiting moves to another elevator, your first
thought is race.32 Little things such as these remind the
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African-American community that, as a black person, you are
paying your “black tax.”33
Yet another tragic consequence of the disparity created by
the Guidelines is the devastation of inner-city communities, in
which family serves as the core foundation.  These communi-
ties are predominately minority-populated.  The disproportion-
ate sentencing scheme has been referred to as the “warehous-
ing” of the sons and daughters of minority communities.34
This warehousing merely postpones the confrontation of a
much more serious problem:
When we put an 18-year-old minority youth in the
federal penitentiary for 10 years for possessing 50
grams of crack, we assure our society of having to deal
with a 28-year-old far less able to be productive in a
society that has progressed in the 10 years, while he
was warehoused in the penitentiary.  Welcome to our
next nightmare.  What do we then do with the 28-
year-old less equipped to lead a productive life in this
society than he was at the age of 18?  How many
prison building campaigns can America afford to
endure?  And how many thousands of minorities can
we afford to incarcerate before we admit that this dis-
parity is directed at the heart and soul of our commu-
nities: our youth.35
It has been theorized that the ultimate effect of warehousing,
yet to be realized, is a “raging epidemic of poor, dumb chil-
dren.”36 Irony lies in that fact that the United States boasts a
label of the richest, most educated nation on earth.  This epi-
demic and these children can be ignored for now, however,
because they lack the power associated with constituency.  
D. The War on Drugs
While facially neutral, the Guidelines contribute to contin-
ued racial discrimination in various insidious ways.  This per-
petuation is often carried out under the guise of America’s “War
on Drugs.”  It was under this guise that the base offense levels
for various categories of drugs were set and the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 was passed.37 Driven by the media-manu-
factured notion that crack cocaine would lead to the ruin of
society, the legislature and its bureaucratic counterparts
adopted the view that crack was far more dangerous than pow-
dered cocaine.38 During this time, Americans (constituents)
cringed at the thought of becoming victims of random, irra-
tional assaults and the fear
and frustration of the aver-
age citizen had grown to a
level of anticipated “lynch
mob mentality,” which
became the common emo-
tional reaction to crime.39
The legislature accepted as
fact the contention that
crack does more harm to the
body than powdered
cocaine and does so faster.
Also, the legislature concluded that crack is more readily avail-
able than powdered cocaine and that its cheaper price makes it
more rampant throughout society.  This heightened view of
crack as an epidemic that necessitated immediate action also
came as a result of the crack overdose of 22-year-old, first
round NBA draft pick, Len Bias, and the death of Cleveland
Browns’ safety Don Rogers.40
Subsequently, all committee work on the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act was completed in five weeks.41 The legislative history of
the 1986 Act is full of racially tinged references to ghettos and
dealers of different ethnicities.42 For example, the following
statement was made on the Senate floor in support of the leg-
islation’s passage: “For the growing numbers of the white mid-
dle class who have become hooked on cocaine rock, buying
the drug can be like stepping into a foreign culture.”43
Certain members of Congress did express concern at the
fast-paced passage of the Act.  Representative Frenzel observed
that the bill was “clumsy” and “put together in the style of a
Great Society Program, as its hallmarks were lack of coordina-
tion, incomplete consideration, and misunderstood compro-
mises.”44 Senator Evans labeled the speedy legislative process
a “sanctimonious election stampede,” which trampled the
Constitution.45 In his opinion, the actions of Congress with
regard to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act resembled a lynch mob, as
opposed to a legislature concerned with careful deliberation
and implementation.46 Senator Mathias also cautioned that
sometimes “in our haste to do something about a serious prob-
lem, we create a whole new array of problems.”47
Despite these objections and the fact that crime proposals
should be considered in a deliberate fashion, without giving in
to ineffective, tough-sounding non-solutions, the bill easily
passed through Congress without regard to usual legislative
procedures.  The legislation merely provided a band-aid
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approach to crime, rather than
treating its root causes.  However,
no political party wished to be
labeled soft on crime in a nation
preoccupied with crime and its
proposed remedies.  The provi-
sions of the Act were then incor-
porated into the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.  
The war on drugs has since
proven to be an abysmal failure.  The effort consumes more
than an estimated $75 billion per year of public money; exacts
an estimated $70 billion a year from consumers; is responsible
for nearly 50% of the millions of Americans who are currently
in jail; occupies an estimated 50% of the trial time of our judi-
ciary; and devours the time of over 400,000 police officers.48
Within the usage of a wartime metaphor, casualties are at
hand—in this war, “we continue to inflict casualties upon our-
selves.”49 The war on drugs is targeted almost exclusively at
inner-city communities and it basically serves as a war on
young, highly visible, and wholly replaceable African-
American street dealers.  The provisions created by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, however, are still in effect and continue to
manufacture chaos.
These provisions created a 100-to-1 ratio between crack and
powder cocaine.50 A defendant convicted of selling 100 grams
of  powdered cocaine has committed a level 18 offense and may
be sentenced to 27 to 33 months.  In contrast, a defendant sell-
ing one gram of crack cocaine will also find himself at a level 18
offense and will be subject to the same sentence, assuming both
have no prior convictions.51 A person would have to possess
500 grams of powdered cocaine to receive the same sentence as
someone found in possession of 5 grams of crack and 5,000
grams of powdered cocaine to receive a sentence equal to some-
one found in possession of 50 grams of crack.52 Ironically, 5
grams of crack can create approximately 10 to 50 doses of the
drug and may sell for an average retail price of $225 to $750
dollars.53 Five hundred grams of powdered cocaine, however,
represents anywhere from  2,500 to 5,000 doses and can sell for
approximately $32,500 to $50,000.54 The dosages and prices
are dependent on the process used to manufacture and weigh
the drug and the available market.55
Crack cocaine, however, has not sufficiently been proven
more harmful than powder cocaine.  Crack and powdered
cocaine are essentially the same substance.  Cocaine is a prod-
uct that occurs freely in nature in the coca leaf and is the basic
building block of other cocaine compounds.  Cocaine’s molec-
ular formula is C17 H21 N4, it has a molecular weight of 303,
and it has a melting point of 98 degrees Centigrade.56
Powdered cocaine is a salt-containing hydrochloric acid,
which is inhaled through the nose.57 Crack is made up of pow-
dered cocaine mixed with baking soda and water, which is
then heated and hardened and broken into small pieces that
are sold as rocks that are smoked in a glass pipe.58 DEA
chemists define crack simply as a “lumpy” substance contain-
ing cocaine and bicarbonate of soda.59 There is no evidence
that the “lumpiness” contributes anything to the potential for
abuse, and, of course, other forms of cocaine and its salts and
isomers can also appear in lumpy forms unless they are milled
into fine particles.60
Though the Guidelines do not distinguish between white
and black defendants, sociologists and criminologists will ver-
ify that use and distribution patterns for crack closely track
inner-city ethnic and racial lines.61 Crack is cheaper than pow-
dered cocaine and is easier to break down and package into
small quantities for distribution.  It is, therefore, prevalent in
the inner cities, where minorities are substantially represented
within the population.  
“No one is suggesting that the street dealer is innocent,”
noted U.S. Representative John Conyers, Jr., “he is not.  But
neither is he the one flying planes to Colombia bringing back
million-dollar cargoes.”62 Since high-level dealers and drug
wholesalers are more likely to handle powdered cocaine, it
makes no sense to give them far lighter sentences than crack
peddlers.63 Peripheral agents of drug kingpins are receiving
disproportionately harsh sentences.  This agent is paid approx-
imately $200 dollars by a drug trafficker for manufacturing
and transporting 50 grams of crack from one city to another
and is subject to a mandatory 10-year sentence, which could
quite possibly be a more substantial sentence than the traf-
ficker who controls the drug organization and will receive the
bulk of the profit, but deals only with powdered cocaine.64 In
a district court decision that has since been reversed, Judge
Clyde Cahill stated that the disproportionate ratio has “created
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a situation that reeks with inhumanity and injustice.”65 Judge
Cahill worried that the scales of justice had been turned and
twisted so that the drug trafficking kingpins, the masterminds,
escape detection, while those who play a trivial role are
“hoisted on the spears of an enraged electorate and at the pin-
nacle of their youth are imprisoned for years while those most
responsible for the evil of the day remain free.”66 The war on
drugs has been referred to as the reincarnation of Jim Crow
laws.67 It would seem to be not only logical, but economically
sensible to devote scarce government resources to reducing the
large ingress and wholesale distribution of powder cocaine by
major traffickers, which would consequently reduce the exis-
tence of crack as a derivative product.  Without cocaine, there
would be no crack.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
“Sadly, . . . one wonders whether the majority [of the court]
still believes that . . . race discrimination against non-whites is
a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”68
Justice Harlan first introduced the idea of a color-blind
Constitution in a 1896 dissent from the Supreme Court deci-
sion regarding Plessy v. Ferguson.69 Unfortunately, in the year
2001, blacks were roughly eight times as likely to end up in jail
as whites and the very notion of color-blind justice remains
endangered.70 Danger lies in the absence of the kinds of com-
mon cultural commitments and shared values that are crucial
to holding any society together.  The extraordinarily difficult
task confronting the Supreme Court lies in crafting a concept
of justice that recognizes a policy-level need for the acknowl-
edgment of racial differences where necessary to overcome
biased practices still in existence.71
A. Excessive Delegation and Separation of Powers
Certain challenges to the constitutionality of the Guidelines
revolve around the Sentencing Commission itself.  The
Commission consists of seven voting members and one non-
voting member.72 The President appoints the voting members,
at least three of whom must be federal judges.73 The three
judges are selected from a list of six judges recommended to
the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States.74
The commissioners are subject to removal by the President for
“neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good
cause shown.”75 Two claims generally raised by defendants
challenging the Guidelines are that the Guidelines violate the
principle of separation of
powers by requiring the
appointment of three federal
judges to the Commission
and that they constitute an
excessive delegation of leg-
islative powers to the judicial
branch.  
Such defenses were raised
by the defendants in
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele,76
who were convicted of vari-
ous unrelated offenses. The
district and appeals courts both agreed.  The Ninth Circuit
held that executive or administrative duties of a non-judicial
nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under
Article III of the Constitution.77 The court determined that the
matters handled by the Commission, including the proper
apportionment of punishment, were peculiarly questions of
legislative policy and that, with the establishment of the
Commission, Congress had effectively delegated legislative
policymaking functions.78 According to the court, these func-
tions are tasks that only the legislative or executive branches,
not the judicial branch, may constitutionally perform.79 This
decision was later vacated by the Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Chavez-Sanchez80 based on Mistretta v. U.S. 81
The Mistretta decision halted all speculation and debate.  In
Mistretta, the Court concluded that, in the creation of the
Sentencing Commission, Congress neither delegated excessive
legislative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated bal-
ance of powers among the coordinate branches.  The Court
found that the functions delegated were non-adjudicatory and
did not trammel the prerogatives of another branch of govern-
ment.82 In the only dissent, Justice Scalia conveyed his con-
cern over the broad discretion given to the Commission to
make value judgments and policy assessments in creating the
Guidelines.83 This case marks the first and the last time that
the Supreme Court has considered an issue that revolves
around the Sentencing Commission or the Guidelines.
B. Due Process
Historically, federal courts have also shown reluctance to
interfere with the type of grant of prosecutorial discretion
involved in the application of the Guidelines.  Most federal
Danger lies in 
the absence of 
the kinds of 
common cultural 
commitments and
shared values that
are critical to 
holding any 
society together.
Winter 2003 - Court Review 29
84. See Maxwell, supra note 37, at 24.  
85. See id.
86. See id.  
87. See id.  
88. U.S. v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
89. See id.
90. See id. 
91. See id. at 1306.
92. See U.S. v. Settle, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3103 at *4 (4th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting Davis).
93. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
94. See Maxwell, supra note 37, at 24.  
95. See Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 258 (1979).  
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
99. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
100. Id. at 292.
101. See Maxwell, supra note 37, at 24-25.  
102. 846 F. Supp. 768, 797 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th
Cir. 1994).
103. See 846 F. Supp. at 796-797.
104. Id. at 769-770.
105. Id.
courts of appeals and district
courts have consistently
upheld the disparity in sen-
tencing between crack and
powder cocaine convictions.
Defendants have argued that
the Guidelines are violative
of due process because
Congress did not give any
legitimate purpose for the
distinctions in crack and
powdered cocaine sentenc-
ing.84 This argument has
generally been deemed invalid due to three justifiable distinc-
tions.  First, courts have determined that crack and powdered
cocaine are two distinct substances and that crack is far more
addictive than cocaine.85 Also, because crack is small in phys-
ical size and inexpensive per dose, other societal problems are
created.86 Last, Congress’s purpose in establishing more strin-
gent punishments for crack convictions was to discourage its
use and distribution.87
The defendants in U.S. v. Davis, however, obtained a rare
victory based on the due process argument in the Northern
District of Georgia.  The defendants both pled guilty to pos-
session of a cocaine base with the intent to distribute.88 The
only asserted challenge was to the constitutionally violative
nature of the Guidelines.89 The court in that case held that the
statute was facially ambiguous because powdered cocaine and
crack are derived from the same substance and have the same
molecular structure, weight, and melting point.  In other
words, the terms “cocaine base” and “cocaine” are synony-
mous.90 The court concluded that the physical form of the
same drug has no rational relationship to any legislative intent
to impose increased penalties that have nothing to do with
potential for abuse.91 Davis was not heard on appeal, but has
subsequently been disagreed with or distinguished in other
decisions of the Northern District of Georgia.92
C. Equal Protection
In federal cases, the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted
to imply an equal protection component forbidding discrimi-
nation that is “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.”93 Crack offense defendants have asserted that the
Guidelines violate the Constitution because they have a dis-
proportionate effect on African-Americans due to the fact that
this racial group is more likely to use and distribute crack than
powdered cocaine.94 The argument has been dismissed based
on the Feeney test, where the Supreme Court held that in order
for a law that is facially neutral to be found unconstitutionally
discriminatory against a racial minority, there must be a find-
ing of discriminatory purpose on the part of the lawmaker.95
The test set forth in Feeney defines discriminatory purpose as
an aspect that implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences.96 According to the Court, dis-
criminatory purpose requires that the decision maker selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
“because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.97 Feeney adds to the conclusion first set
forth in Washington v. Davis, 98 which stated that dispropor-
tionate impact on a certain group of people is not irrelevant,
but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrim-
ination.  Also, the Court has determined that a certain degree
of specificity is required in disproportionate impact challenges.  
In McClesky v. Kemp, 99 the Court held that statistical proof
of discriminatory impact in the administration of the death
penalty was insufficient to show an equal protection violation.
The Court concluded that in order for the defendant to
demonstrate an equal protection violation, he “must prove that
the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory pur-
pose.”100 In general, the courts have repeatedly failed to find
any discriminatory purpose in the legislative history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the disproportionate racial
impact has been deemed a mere consequence of a facially neu-
tral law.  The Guidelines have been measured only by a ratio-
nal basis standard, which means that the state must show
merely a reasonable connection between the statute and its jus-
tification of public welfare.101
Once again, a lone case serves as the antithesis of the gen-
eral rule.  The district court in U.S. v. Clary, 102 held that the
disproportionate penalties for crack cocaine violate equal pro-
tection generally and as applied in the case of the defendant.
The court further held that purposeful discrimination was pre-
sent in the enactment of the law.103 Due to of the novel and
controversial nature of the decision, the court made certain
that every facet of its reasoning was explained in the opinion.
The 18-year-old defendant in Clary was arrested for possession
with intent to distribute 67.76 grams of crack cocaine.104
Clary pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack,
a crime punishable by a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years imprisonment.105 Prior to sentencing, Clary, a black
male, filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the
Guidelines that pertained to crack cocaine and contended that
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they violated his equal protection rights.  Early in the opinion
the court agreed with Clary’s assertion and recognized that the
sentencing provision for cocaine base “has been directly
responsible for incarcerating nearly an entire generation of
young, black American men for very long periods, usually dur-
ing the most productive time of their lives.”106 The opinion
goes on to provide the reasons why the crack provision of the
Guidelines “shocks the conscience of the Court.”107
The Clary court based its decision on the constitutionally
foundational requirement that persons similarly situated must
be treated alike.108 The opinion first explains that the dispro-
portionate racial effect that results from the crack provision
places the provision in the category of laws that are discrimi-
natory as applied.109 In order to justify this determination, the
court relied on Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation.110 In Arlington, the Supreme
Court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine
whether a law was enacted with discriminatory purpose.
These factors include the historical context of the subject mat-
ter, the ultimate effect of the law at issue, any deviation from
standard practice, and the legislative and administrative his-
tory of the particular law.111
With regard to the Arlington factors, the Clary court found
that historically, Congress had been motivated along racial lines
with respect to drug policy.  The court based this finding on
previous United States drug enactments, such as anti-opium
legislation motivated by a notion of the “yellow peril” Far East
military threat of the early 1900s.112 The court also examined
the Harrison Act of 1914, the first federal law to prohibit distri-
bution of cocaine and heroin.  The court relied on evidence that
the Act was passed on the heels of overblown media accounts
depicting heroin-addicted black prostitutes and criminals in the
cities.113 The court found that the author of the Act,
Representative Francis Harrison, moved to include coca leaves
in the bill “since the leaves make Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola and
all those things are sold to Negroes all over the South.”114 In
viewing the ultimate effect of the cocaine base provision, the
Clary court found disproportionate impact obvious.  The court
relied on statistics that indicated that 98.2% of defendants con-
victed of crack cocaine charges in the Eastern District of
Missouri between the years 1988 and 1992 were black.115 In
comparison, 45.2% of defendants sentenced for powder cocaine
were white, while 20.7% were black defendants.116
Concerning deviation from standard practice, the court placed
great emphasis on the astoundingly expedient passage of the
legislation that contained the crack provision. The opinion con-
cluded that if such a law had been proposed in relation to pow-
der cocaine, it would have been
much more carefully and delib-
erately considered due to its
inevitable effect of sentencing
droves of young white men to
prison for extended terms.117
In the same context, the court
also considered the biased state-
ments discussed earlier, which
were set forth on the House
floor to gain perspective as to
the legislative history.118 The
court found that in reviewing the factors presented in Arlington,
the crack cocaine provision of the Sentencing Guidelines was
enacted with discriminatory purpose.
In Clary, the court also went on to explain that a new and
equally dangerous breed of racism exists and serves as an addi-
tional motivation for the 100 to 1 crack/cocaine ratio enact-
ment.119 This new breed is “unconscious racism” and, accord-
ing to the court, it has arisen as a result of the myths and fal-
lacies of white superiority, which the nation has been inun-
dated with for centuries.120 The court reasoned that this
notion of superiority has become so deeply embedded in the
white majority that its acceptance and socialization from gen-
eration to generation has become mere routine.121 In the view
of the court,
A benign neglect for the harmful impact or fallout
upon the black community that might ensue from
decisions made by the white community for the
“greater good” of society has replaced intentional dis-
crimination. In the “enlightened and politically cor-
rect 90s,” whites have become indignant at the sug-
gestion that they harbor any ill-will towards blacks or
retain any vestiges of racism. After all, they have black
friends. They work with black people every day. They
enjoy black entertainers on their favorite television
programs every night.122
As a result of its conclusions, the Clary court decided to
impose a sentence in accordance within the range of the
Sentencing Guidelines for powder cocaine, which would be for
21 to 27 months.123 This initial decision, however, was
reversed on appeal.124 The appeals court illustrated tremen-
dous concern at the district court’s reliance on unconscious
racism and found that the assertions offered by the defendant
did not evidence that the crack cocaine provision was enacted
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“because of,” and not merely
“in spite of” discriminatory
purpose.125
D. Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
The final constitutional
argument offered against the
sentencing disparity is that
the Guidelines are cruel and
unusual punishment and
violative of the Eighth
Amendment because the sentencing is unduly severe com-
pared with the crime committed.126 The courts have once
again deemed that substantial deference must be granted to the
broad authority that the legislature necessarily possesses in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.127
However, one district court did find merit in this claim.  In U.S.
v. Walls, defendants Blakney and Campbell were employed as
crack cocaine cookers.128 The two were asked to cook
amounts of powdered cocaine for undercover DEA officers.129
Blakney was paid $100 compensation, while Campbell’s pay-
ment was in the form of a small rock of crack cocaine.130
Blakney faced a mandatory sentence of 10 years and Campbell
faced 20 years.131 Both were drug addicts and it was this con-
dition that led the court to a finding that such sentences would
violate the Eighth Amendment.132
The court’s finding was based on the 1962 Supreme Court
decision of Robinson v. California.133 The Walls court inter-
preted the Robinson holding as stating that criminal punish-
ment of a drug addict on account of his addiction is cruel and
unusual.134 Robinson invalidated a state law that imprisoned a
drug addict as a criminal, even though he had never touched
any narcotic drug within the state or been found guilty of any
irregular behavior there.135 Robinson recognized drug addiction
as an “illness which may be contracted innocently or involun-
tarily.”136 Thus, the Walls court sentenced Blakney and
Campbell in accordance with the ranges prescribed for powder
cocaine offenses: 24 to 30 months in the case of Blakney, and
27 to 33 months for Campbell.  Both were also to be subjected
to six years of probation upon release.137
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia determined that Robinson  merely held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids punishing a drug addict merely for
the status of being an addict and that the Eighth Amendment
does not command individualized sentencing and it does not
require consideration of mitigating factors in non-capital
cases.138 Thus, the decision was reversed and remanded for
resentencing.
IV. REFORMS
Judicially, it appears that constitutional challenges to the
Sentencing Guidelines present virtually insurmountable odds
for the crack cocaine offender.  Numerous reform proposals,
however, have been offered in an attempt to halt the devastat-
ing impact inflicted upon minorities by the application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  However, reform has been
tempered by a recognition that the Guidelines are likely to
remain intact for some time to come because major legal
reforms are always slow in coming.  In our country, it seems
that reshaping, redirecting, or eliminating any bureaucracy is a
Herculean endeavor.139 The fact that criminal sentencing is a
highly charged political issue in our society implies that reform
in this area will be an even harder task. 
Principal critics of the Guidelines, federal judges, for all
their vaunted independence and high status, are also poorly
positioned and generally unable to influence national legisla-
tive policy.140 The very complexity and intricacy of this large
body of rules easily discourages any observer—policy maker,
legislator, or lay citizen—tempted to take an interest in how
federal crimes are punished.141
This historical reluctance to implement reforms in this area,
which are so badly needed, along with the desire of our
nation’s leaders to pretend that racism and discrimination are
both phenomena of the past, could prove fatal for the
Sentencing Guidelines reform movement. The public percep-
tion of African-Americans as inferior and venal beings has tra-
ditionally provided the basis of acceptability for the most out-
rageous of lies and, in some instances, continues to do so.142
“Progress toward racial equality has been halting, at best.”143
Instead, the nation often seems to be retreating from the values
of a time in which there existed substantial consensus on the
need for racial pluralism in positions of power and for the
opportunity of upward mobility.144 Time is of the essence:
It will be impossible for African Americans to
achieve justice through traditional politics, including
exercising their hard gained franchise.  Perhaps
“impossible” is too strong; it’s better to say that it will
take too long, and African Americans can’t afford to
wait, considering the emergency nature of the crisis.
It will take too long because the only way African
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Americans win in our winner-take-all democracy is to
persuade white people to vote with them.  For matters
of racial justice, that is really tough.  If it took the
white majority more than 200 years to understand
that slavery was wrong, and approximately 100 years
to realize that segregation was wrong (and still many
don’t understand), how long will it take them to per-
ceive that American criminal justice is evil?  And in
the meantime, what should African Americans do?
When one’s house is on fire, should one wait for the
people who set the fire to put it out?145
The criminal justice system places too much emphasis on
punishment and not enough on justice.  The Guidelines are
based on the incorrect premise that incarceration is the only
tough form of punishment.  No one who has ever visited a jail
or  prison and seen fellow human beings locked in cages like
animals can ever be unmindful of the enormity and severity of
society’s decision to deprive one of its members of his or her
liberty.146 The good news is that programs do exist that stop
crime more effectively and that cost less than prison.  The bad
news is that most people, particularly lawmakers, seem not to
care.  An empirical study by the Rand Corporation found that
the best way to prevent crime is to provide financial and health
services to poor children and their families.147 Per dollar
spent, such intervention was shown to prevent more crime
than sending offenders to prison.148 It makes a great deal of
sense.  “If people commit certain kinds of crimes because they
are poor and hopeless, give them money and hope.”149 Until
we, as a society become as eager to provide those things for the
young black population as we are to provide them with jail
cells, reform seems to be nothing more than a distant, wholly
unachievable idea.150
A. Legislative and Executive Reform
The legislature has been granted a tremendous amount of
deference and is viewed as the proper forum for eliminating
the disparity.  In May of 1995, the annual congressional report
of the Sentencing Commission revealed a unanimous agree-
ment among the commissioners that the 100-to-1 ratio is far
too great.151 The Commission balanced statistics that evinced
discrete and substantial harm to minority communities with
the factors that had originally induced the vast ratio, such as
availability of the drug and the harm caused by the sub-
stance.152 In doing so, the Commission determined that the
100-to-1 ratio was unwar-
ranted and, in its report, the
Commission recommended
an amendment to the drug
sentencing guidelines that
would entirely eliminate the
cocaine sentencing dispar-
ity.153 The proposed amend-
ment set sentences for an
offense involving equivalent
amounts of crack cocaine and
powder cocaine at the level currently provided for powder
cocaine.154 Congress rejected the suggested amendment and
directed the commission to recommend further amendments
imposing higher sentences for trafficking in crack cocaine.155
Out of 500 recommendations submitted by the Commission
since its inception, this rejection marked the first time that
Congress overrode the Commission’s advice.156
Since the initial congressional rejection, at least one defen-
dant has attempted to use Congress’s refusal to adjust the ratio
to prove the purposeful discrimination required under Feeney.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found in U.S. v. Teague157 that with Congress’s reaffir-
mation of the 100-to-1 ratio, the legislative body simply
decided that the 1-to-1 ratio proposed was inadequate. The
court found no evidence that Congress reaffirmed the ratio “at
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’” its adverse
effects upon African-Americans.158
B. Capacity-Based Guidelines
Other proposals for reform include the adoption of rational,
capacity-based sentencing guidelines.  In effect, such guide-
lines would actually impose a sentence proportionate to the
crime committed.  These proposed guidelines would guide
judges in the exercise of their sentencing discretion, not
impose strict, rigid regulations.159 They would also ensure that
the criminal penalties imposed do not exceed the resources
made available to the corrections systems.160 This suggested
system of Guidelines would also include the adoption of a
requirement of  a corrections impact statement, which would
detail the increased number of prisoners predicted and the
prison administration’s capacity to house them.161 The impact
statement would be submitted before any legislation that could
raise the number of people subject to a particular sanction,
such as imprisonment, is ever enacted.162
The Guidelines 
are based on the
incorrect premise
that incarceration
is the only 
tough form of 
punishment.
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163. Drug Court Review: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Subcomm. on Youth Violence, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of
Michael E. McMaken, Mobile, Alabama, Drug Court Judge).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Darden, supra note 23, at 27.
173. See Higginbotham, supra note 16, at xxxi-xxxii (quoting Justice
Thurgood Marshall).
C. Drug Court
Yet another proposal is the establishment of a federal drug
court.  By 2000, approximately 450 drug court programs had
been implemented in states throughout the country.163 Drug
courts dispose of criminal cases while providing treatment to
reduce the amount of drug abuse and its related social costs.
They are premised on the assumption that it is infinitely better
to keep a person out of prison, working, and paying taxes, as
opposed to paying $15,000 to $25,000 per year to feed, clothe,
secure, and provide medical care for that person.164
Within the general confines of the drug court program, a
defendant charged with a nonviolent, drug related or drug-
driven felony can elect to plead guilty and enter drug court.
The prosecution must approve the application.  After the guilty
plea is entered, the court defers sentencing and admits the
defendant to a drug treatment program, which is court based,
has three phases, and is expected to last for one full year.165
During the treatment program, the defendant is required to
attend weekly group treatment sessions and meet with a case
manger and treatment counselor for individual review ses-
sions.166 Also, the defendant must submit to frequent drug
testing, attend a prescribed number of Narcotics Anonymous
or Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly, and pay the treat-
ment fee of $1,500 a year.167 Another requirement of the pro-
gram is the periodic court appearance ordered by the judge to
verify program compliance.168 The defendant must test drug-
free for a minimum of six months prior to graduation.169
Failure to meet the imposed requirements result in a custodial
prison sentence without the need for further court proceed-
ings.170 Defendants who successfully complete the program
have their guilty plea set aside and their cases dismissed at a
formal graduation ceremony where friends, family, fellow drug
court participants, and the judge are present.171
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were originally created
to produce a more equitable sentencing scheme; however, the
opposite effect has resulted and the Guidelines have become a
major source of societal perpetration of racial inequality.  The
Guidelines have had a devastating effect on the minority pop-
ulation of the United States and the non-relenting, steadily ris-
ing incarceration of minorities serves a purpose of destroying
minority communities by removing members of a certain race,
mainly African-Americans, and isolating them during the most
productive years of their lives.172 The lingering question—
Why should a black drug offender in America receive a different
sentence than a white drug offender?— presents another seem-
ingly obvious answer: He shouldn’t!  The fact that this matter
has not proven to be blatantly obvious to Congress and its leg-
islative agencies should invoke outrage and reform movements
across the nation.  Sadly, both outrage and reform remain mere
aspirations, rather than realizations.  
Six months before his death, former Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall gave a Fourth-of-July address at
Independence Hall in Philadelphia:
I wish I could say that racism and preju-
dice were only distant memories . . . and that
liberty and equality were just around the
bend.  I wish I could say that America has
come to appreciate diversity . . . .  But as I
look around, I see not a nation of unity but of
division—Afro and white, indigenous and
immigrant, rich and poor, educated and illit-
erate . . . .  But there is a price to be paid for
division and isolation.
. . . .  We cannot play ostrich.  Democracy
cannot flourish amid fear.  Liberty cannot
bloom amid hate.  Justice cannot take root
among rage.  We must go against the prevail-
ing wind. . . .  We must dissent from the fear,
the hatred, and the mistrust.173
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have created fences of
division that must be knocked down and literal walls of
imprisonment that must be torn apart.  The national legislature
continues to play ostrich and, thus, democracy’s flourish is
hindered amid fear, while liberty’s bloom remains stagnant in
the face of hate.  Society must go against the prevailing wind
and must dissent from the disastrous consequences of the rag-
ing storm created by the Sentencing Guidelines.
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spectrum ranging from initial summoning
to final dismissal after verdict.
Contemporaneously, prescriptive packages
will be developed to describe practices
that have proven to be highly effective in
states that have already undertaken jury
trial renovations.  
To begin implementation, a “to-be-deter-
mined” number of courts will be selected.
The chief justice and state court adminis-
trator will be approached and involved to
the fullest extent in each case.  When the
court selections are made, program staff
will work directly with the courts to estab-
lish an individualized plan of action from a
full menu of jury innovations.  
Measurable results of the program are
expected to include: the increased use of
innovative practices by judges, reduced
“burden” upon jurors and employers,
reduced citizen non-response to sum-
monses, a greater proportion of our popu-
lation actually serving on juries, less juror
waiting time in court, fewer questions
asked by deliberating juries, and a better
trained judiciary.  There will also be more
instances of juries being representative of
the community in terms of age, education,
occupation, and profession.  Across our
land we should see more efficient and
cost-effective jury systems.  Trial jurors
will be better informed.  In other words,
juror decision making and satisfaction will
be enhanced.  Importantly, there should be
greater public trust in jury verdicts and the
courts.  
Court Review readers are urged to take
every opportunity to spread word of the
program to bar and community leaders.
Moral and financial support for the pro-
gram is needed.  For more information,
please contact Tom Munsterman [National
Center for State Courts’ Center for Jury
Studies] at tmunsterman@ncsc.dni.us or
Ms. Priscilla Skillman [Council for Court
Excellence] at skillman@courtexcel-
lence.com.
o
ONLINE JURY NEWSLETTER
The National Center for State Courts
publishes a free weekly online newsletter
called “Jur-E Bulletin.” To subscribe, go to
www.ncsconline.org and select “newslet-
ters.”
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ALCOHOL IGNITION INTERLOCKS
& OTHER IMPAIRED DRIVING
RESOURCES
In his article in this issue, Judge Andy
Fulkerson provides a useful overview of
the use of ignition interlock devices that
can keep alcohol-impaired drivers from
operating their vehicles (see page 18).  For
those who would like additional informa-
tion, here are some other resources specif-
ically on ignition interlocks and more gen-
erally on impaired driving:
DOUGLAS J. BEIRNESS & HERB M. SIMPSON,
ALCOHOL INTERLOCKS AS A CONDITION OF
LICENCE REINSTATEMENT.  Traffic Injury
Research Foundation, 2003 (available free
on the web).  51 pp.
Available at http://trafficinjuryresearch.
com/publications/pub_details.cfm?intPub
ID=176.
The Traffic Injury Research
Foundation is an independent, char-
itable road safety institute in Canada
(thus the spelling of “licence” in the
publication title).  This report arose
out of an international symposium
on interlock devices held in Toronto
in 2001.  The symposium included
attendees from Canada, the United
States, Europe, and Australia.  This
report reviews research on alcohol
interlock programs and common
features of these programs.  While
the Toronto conference and the
report were funded at least in part by
an interlock manufacturer, the mate-
rials include a wealth of research
data and a summary of current prac-
tice in this area.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
KNOWLEDGE & INFORMATION SERVICE,
IMPAIRED DRIVING: DRUGS & ALCOHOL:
RESOURCE GUIDE.  National Center for State
Courts, 2003.  7 pp. with links to addi-
tional materials.
Available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/Publications/KIS_ImpDriGuide.pdf.
For a judge newly assigned to a
docket that includes impaired dri-
vers—or an experienced judge look-
ing for greater understanding of the
problem and potential solutions—
this is an excellent starting point.  As
a web-based resource guide, it con-
tains links to more than 25 resources
available on the web, including both
specific publications and other use-
ful websites.  It also lists many other
publications that are available
through the National Center for
State Courts.  The guide ends with a
request form that can be used to
order a copy of any of the listed
resources that are not available on
the web.
C
NATIONAL JURY REFORM 
PROJECT LAUNCHED
Whether it is an accounting fraud pros-
ecution in New York or a mental retarda-
tion determination in a capital murder
case in Richmond, the American jury is
repeatedly being called upon to render
verdicts in weighty and complex matters.
Unfortunately, it is common for jurors
across the country to perform these
weighty tasks in unfit conditions and
without the learning tools that we take for
granted in school.   While computers and
interactive technology are becoming com-
monplace in our classrooms, juror note-
taking and questioning of expert witnesses
are customarily discouraged in most
courtrooms.  
In addition, there is the recurring
diminishment of governmental funding
for trial courts and widespread citizen
reluctance to respond to summonses for
jury duty.  Is it any wonder that citizens
are dodging jury service in record num-
bers?  
It should be good news to readers that
court leaders are taking steps to perform at
a higher level with respect to jurors.
Indeed a National Program to Increase
Citizen Participation in Jury Service
Through Jury Innovations is being
launched.  The program builds on
momentum from the first-ever National
Jury Summit in 2001, led by Chief Judge
Judith Kaye of the New York Unified
Court System and the National Center for
State Courts.  
The purpose of the jury summit was to
bring together representatives from across
the nation to examine the state of
America’s jury system, share innovative
practices, and plan for continued improve-
ment.  Over 400 persons from 45 states
attended, including state and federal
judges from the trial and appellate
benches, court administrators, clerks,
attorneys, representatives from commu-
nity-based organizations, and even jurors.
The legacy of the jury summit is to
encourage other states to follow suit and
expand efforts to improve the jury system
nationwide.  The results have been
encouraging—states like Kentucky,
Georgia, and Nevada have begun measur-
able steps forward.  
Following basic themes of the jury
summit, this new program will center on
citizen outreach and improving the condi-
tions of jury service. The program will
provide courts with methods to improve
citizen attitudes toward jury service.  It
will also provide technical assistance to
help jurisdictions make the jury trial itself
a more information-centered endeavor.  
The National Center for State Courts
will lead these efforts through its Center
for Jury Studies.  It will be joined by other
jury leadership organizations, including
the Council for Court Excellence
(Washington, D.C.) and the Maricopa
County Trial Court Leadership Center
(Phoenix).
The program will undertake a sequence
of tasks.  First, it will systematically
develop a compendium of current state
jury management practices known as the
“State of the States.”  This will establish
the baseline measure of the statutes, rules,
and customs that define jury systems
across the country.  The State of the States
documentation will span an operational 
Continued on page 39
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